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GOOD MEDICINE:  WHY PHARMACISTS 
SHOULD BE PRESCRIBED A RIGHT OF 
CONSCIENCE 
On some positions, Cowardice asks the question, “Is it safe?”  Expediency asks 
the question, “Is it politic?”  And Vanity comes along and asks the question, “Is 
it popular?”  But conscience asks the question “Is it right?”  And there comes a 
time when one must take a position that is neither safe, nor politic, nor popular, 
but he must do it because Conscience tells him it is right. 
–Martin Luther King, Jr.1 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Medical professions are among those where ethics and morality are 
of paramount concern.2  The ease with which pharmacists, doctors, 
scientists, and other healthcare professionals can cross over the line of 
reason into ethical quagmires requires vigilance on their part, a 
willingness to illuminate ethical problems as they occur, and respect 
from society for those whose consciences compel them to resist conduct 
they find objectionable.3  The pharmacist, like the physician, is a healer, a 
human being with a personality and moral convictions.4  However, in 
recent years, the interest of the pharmacist to comply with his or her 
conscience has collided with the interest of the patient seeking a 
medication whose purpose or effect may be morally objectionable to the 
pharmacist.5 
Recent actions by courts and state legislatures have created a 
Hobson’s choice for pharmacists:  disobey your conscience or lose your 
job.6  Neither the conscientious pharmacist—more than just a glorified 
pill dispenser—nor any other healthcare provider should be compelled 
                                                 
1 Merriam-Webster Online, Word for the Wise:  January 15, 2007 Broadcast:  Topic:  
Doctor Martin Luther King, Junior, http://www.merriam-webster.com/cgi-bin/wftwarch. 
pl?011507 (last visted Jan. 25, 2010). 
2 Cf. infra note 38 and accompanying text (discussing the improvement in U.S. medical 
ethics starting in the nineteenth century). 
3 See infra note 208 (discussing the manipulation of the medical community in Nazi 
Germany). 
4 See infra Part IV.A (discussing the importance of conscience protection for 
pharmacists). 
5 See infra notes 137–49 and accompanying text (discussing conscience law critics’ 
beliefs that patient needs may not be met by objecting pharmacists). 
6 See Bradley L. Davis, Note, Compelled Expression of the Religiously Forbidden:  
Pharmacists, “Duty to Fill” Statutes, and the Hybrid Rights Exception, 29 U. HAW. L. REV. 97, 
118 (2006) (discussing the concept of a Hobson’s Choice).  See infra Parts II.B.2.a–b, II.C 
(discussing state and federal laws pertaining to conscience and also the professional 
standards of the pharmaceutical industry, respectively). 
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or coerced into acting contrary to deeply held beliefs.7  Thus, right-of-
conscience laws, which have a long tradition in both the military and the 
medical profession, are appropriate for pharmacists, who should not be 
compelled to interface with medications they find morally objectionable.8 
In Part II, this Note explores the primary source of controversy for 
pharmacists—interfacing with drugs labeled as contraceptives—and the 
reasons why many pharmacists object to these medications.9  This Part 
then examines the role of conscientious objection throughout the history 
of the United States military and in the medical profession in the United 
States of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries to demonstrate that 
respect for conscience has long been a part of American law.10  In 
addition, Part II briefly surveys the current status of conscience laws at 
both the state and federal levels, including the regulation recently issued 
by the Department of Health and Human Services aimed at greater 
enforcement of existing federal laws, and also addresses the American 
Pharmacists Association’s stance on conscientious objection by 
pharmacists.11 
Part III analyzes the debate over the value of pharmacist conscience 
laws and their constitutionality by briefly exploring:  whether 
inconvenience is an adequate justification to require pharmacists to 
dispense medications to which they object; the differences between 
substantial and incidental burdens on constitutional rights; the extent of 
protection for the free exercise of religion after Employment Division, 
Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith;12 the difference 
between alleviating a government-imposed burden on religion and 
extending free exercise rights; and whether a duty to dispense 
medications even exists.13 
                                                 
7 See infra Part IV.A (examining the importance of conscience protection for 
pharmacists). 
8 Cf. infra Part II.B.1–2 (discussing the role of conscientious objection throughout the 
history of the U.S. military and in the U.S. medical profession of the twentieth and twenty-
first centuries). 
9 See infra Part II.A (explaining the reasons pharmacists may object to contraceptives).  
This Note’s referral to certain drugs being contraceptives, or any references to 
contraceptives in general, should not be interpreted as the author’s belief that they do in 
fact function to prevent conception. 
10 See infra Part II.B.1–2 (looking at conscientious objection in the U.S. military and the 
medical profession). 
11 See infra Parts II.B.2.a–b, II.C (reviewing state and federal conscience laws and 
professional standards for pharmacists). 
12 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990) (holding that religious believers may be subject to neutral and 
generally applicable laws). 
13 See infra Part III.A–F (all analyzing constitutional issues pertaining to pharmacist 
conscience laws). 
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Finally, Part IV examines the importance of preserving medical 
ethics and the ability of healthcare providers to exercise their 
consciences, offers recommendations to pharmacists on how to avoid 
conflicts with their patients over conscientious objection, and proposes a 
model right-of-conscience statute.14 
II.  BACKGROUND 
This Part explores the primary source of controversy for objecting 
pharmacists and the role of conscientious objection in both the United 
States military and in the U.S. medical profession of the twentieth and 
twenty-first centuries, at both state and federal levels.15  Finally, this Part 
briefly addresses the professional standards of the pharmaceutical 
profession.16 
A. The Pill Controversy 
A request for drugs or devices labeled as contraceptives, Plan-B (also 
known as the “morning-after” pill), or RU-486 commonly creates an 
ethical dilemma for pharmacists.17  Approximately fourteen million 
women in the United States use any one of forty different brands of oral 
contraceptives each year.18  The American College of Obstetricians and 
                                                 
14 See infra Part IV (discussing the value of pharmacist conscience laws, ways 
pharmacists can avoid liability, and proposing a model conscience law).  While the goal of 
this Note is to address the conscience issues of pharmacists, at times it speaks generally 
about healthcare providers outside the pharmaceutical industry because the ethical 
dilemmas shared by all those in the medical field are quite similar. 
15 See infra Parts II.A–B (enumerating the reasons why pharmacists may object to 
contraceptives and the history of conscientious objection in the U.S. military and the U.S. 
medical profession of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries). 
16 See infra Part II.C (discussing professional standards for pharmacists). 
17 Cf. Amy Bergquist, Note, Pharmacist Refusals:  Dispensing (With) Religious 
Accommodation Under Title VII, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1073, 1074 (2006).  Plan-B is a medicine 
designed for use after unprotected sex or the failure of a contraceptive and can function by 
preventing conception or by preventing the implantation of a fertilized egg onto the uterine 
wall.  See infra notes 26–27 and accompanying text (discussing same). 
18 RANDY ALCORN, DOES THE BIRTH CONTROL PILL CAUSE ABORTIONS? 10 (2007) 
http://www.epm.org/media–files/pdf/bcpill.pdf.  Oral contraceptives (“Ocs”) are also 
referred to as birth control pills (“BCPs”), oral contraceptive pills (“OCPs”), or 
Combination Pills because they can contain a mix of the hormones estrogen and progestin.  
Id.  Objection among pharmacists to contraceptives likely encompasses all forms of 
contraceptives (patches, implants, etcetera), and not just pill versions, so long as they can 
have an abortifacient effect.  Cf. infra note 23 and text accompanying note 31 (explaining 
that in spite of their advertised purpose, certain medications would be inappropriate as 
prescribed for birth control and that those who object to surgical abortions are likely to 
object to chemical abortions, respectively).  This Note’s discussion of oral contraceptives 
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Gynecologists defines conception as the implantation of a blastocyst (the 
human embryo after six or seven days of development) onto the inner 
lining of the uterus; traditionally, conception was understood to occur at 
the moment a sperm fertilized an egg.19  Oral contraceptives can operate 
in any of several ways:  by suppressing ovulation, the release of an egg 
from the ovary; by altering the mucus lining of the cervix; or by altering 
the lining of the uterus to prevent implantation of the fertilized egg.20  
The last scenario presents the most serious moral dilemma to 
pharmacists who believe that a mechanism that prevents the 
implantation of a fertilized egg onto the uterus, thereby resulting in its 
destruction, operates as an abortifacient, not as a contraceptive.21  As 
                                                                                                             
should not be interpreted as a limitation on the kinds of contraceptives that can act as 
abortifacients or to which pharmacists might object. 
19 ALCORN, supra note 18, at 7–8.  The notion that conception occurs at implantation is an 
“archaic” one, with “roots in an Aristotelian understanding of human reproduction, which 
held that the male semen contained the entire human person in potentiality[,]” and that the 
woman “had a passive part[,]” playing a role “like that of mother earth providing the seed 
with the nutrition and proper environment in which to grow.”  Charles D. Dern, Speaking 
Clearly about Early Life, ETHICS & MEDICS, March 2009, at 3.  Dr. Charles D. Dern states that: 
defining pregnancy using the archaic definition of conception is to insist 
that somehow a fertilized ovum is more human after implantation.  In 
the normal progression of nascent human life, the milestones of 
viability and implantation are distinctions without differences.  Whether 
one prevents implantation or procures an abortion at any other point 
during gestation, the natural growth of another human being is stifled. 
Id. at 4. 
20 JAMES J. RYBACKI, THE ESSENTIAL GUIDE TO PRESCRIPTION DRUGS 2006 778 (2006).  
Alcorn notes that “Magnetic Resonance Imaging studies demonstrate that the lining of the 
endometrium is dramatically thinned in Pill users.  Normal endometrial thickness that can 
sustain a pregnancy ranges in density from 5 to 13 mm.  The average thickness in pill users 
is 1.1 mm.”  ALCORN, supra note 18, at 28. 
21 Nicholas Tonti-Filippini differentiates between an abortifacient and a contraceptive: 
 A contraceptive effect occurs when the natural process of human 
generation originating in the marital act is prevented, by some form of 
deliberate intervention in the human body or in the act itself, from 
resulting in fertilization of an ovum by a sperm. 
 An abortifacient effect occurs when intervention takes place of a 
kind which would be likely, if fertilization were to have occurred, to 
destroy the human zygote, embryo or fetus, to prevent its 
implantation, or to cause an implanted embryo or fetus to miscarry.  
The human zygote is the cell formed by the fusion of the two gametes. 
The Pill: Abortifacient or Contraceptive? A Literature Review, LINACRE Q., Feb. 1995, 5, available 
at http://www.cin.org/life/pillabor.html. 
 Even if contraceptives did not sometimes function as abortifacients, some pharmacists 
might still object to interfacing with them if they believe that their use—regardless of 
possible abortive effect—is contrary to their religious beliefs about procreation.  See, e.g., 
Pope Paul VI, Humanae Vitae:  On Human Life (1968), available at http://www.priestsforlife. 
org/magisterium/humanaevitae.htm (asserting that direct interruption of human gestation 
is to be considered illicit by Catholics).  Catholic pharmacists may also be influenced by a 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 44, No. 2 [2010], Art. 5
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol44/iss2/5
2010] Good Medicine 513 
Doctors Walter L. Larimore and Joseph B. Stanford note, “[f]or patients 
who believe that human life begins at fertilization (conception), a method 
of birth control that has the potential of interrupting development after 
fertilization (a postfertilization effect) may not be acceptable.”22 
                                                                                                             
2008 publication in which the Vatican asserted that where medications like Plan-B are 
concerned, “scientific studies indicate that the effect of inhibiting implantation is certainly 
present, even if this does not mean that such interceptives cause an abortion every time they 
are used.”  Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, Instruction Dignitas Personae on 
Certain Biotethical Questions (2008), available at http://www.priestsforlife.org/magisterium/ 
dignitas-personae.htm.  Thus, “anyone who seeks to prevent the implantation of an 
embryo which may possibly have been conceived and who therefore either requests or 
prescribes such a pharmaceutical, generally intends abortion.”  Id. 
 In addition, Pedro José María Simón Castellví, President of the International 
Federation of Catholic Medical Associations (“FIAMC”), has stated that: 
the means of contraception violate at least five important rights:  the 
right to life, the right to health, the right to education, all right to 
information (their spread is at the expense of information on natural 
resources) and the right to equality between the sexes (the burden of 
contraception falls mostly on women). 
Hilary White, Vatican Newspaper Publishes Article Detailing Birth Control Pill as Cause of 
Abortion and Cancer, Feb. 1995, http://www.lifesitenews.com/ldn/2009/jan/09010504. 
html. 
 In January, 2009, the FIAMC issued a 100-page report that, by relying on 300 
bibliographic citations to mostly specialized medical journals, “‘clearly demonstrates’ that 
anovulant, low-dose hormonal birth control pills work not only by preventing ovulation 
but also by causing the death of an already existing child in the uterine wall.”  Id.  Hilary 
White continues: 
This embryonic person, Castellvi wrote, “even in its early days, is 
something other than an egg or female germ cell.”  From the 
embryonic stage, the child grows in a coordinated way and this 
development, unless prevented, “ends with its exit from the womb in 
nine months, ready to devour a litre of milk.” 
Id. 
 Dr. Maureen Condic has asserted, in light of the medical research on the subject, that 
“sperm-egg fusion is indeed a scientifically well defined ‘instant’ in which the zygote (a 
new cell with unique genetic composition, molecular composition, and behavior) is 
formed,” and that the zygote “is not merely a unique human cell, but a cell with all the 
properties of a fully complete (albeit immature) human organism; it is ‘an individual 
constituted to carry on the activities of life by means of organs separate in function but 
mutually dependent:  a living being.’”  Maureen Condic, When Does Human Life Begin?  A 
Scientific Perspective, The Westchester Institute for Ethics and the Human Person, available at 
www.westchesterinstitute.net/images/wi_whitepaper_life_print.pdf (last visited Aug. 16, 
2009). 
 Regardless of their religious beliefs, some pharmacists may believe that contraceptives 
encourage or facilitate sexual promiscuity.  Rob Stein, ‘Pro-Life’ Drugstores Market Beliefs, 
WASH. POST, June 16, 2008, at A1, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/ 
content/article/2008/06/15/AR2008061502180.html?hpid=topnews (last visited Aug. 16, 
2009). 
 In addition, some pharmacists may be hesitant to prescribe contraceptives because of 
the serious health risks they can pose.  See, e.g., Thaddeus M. Baklinski, Studies Find 
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Many drugs called contraceptives feature literature explaining that 
the medication can work by affecting the lining of the uterus and 
preventing implantation.23  For instance, the oral contraceptive Lybrel 
                                                                                                             
Contraception Makes Women Obese and Newborns Too Thin, LifeSiteNews.com, March 9, 2009, 
http://www.lifesitenews.com/ldn/2009/mar/09030907.html: 
women who had taken the pill within 30 days of getting pregnant were 
more than three times as likely to have a very low-weight newborn 
(under 3.3 lbs) and twice as likely to have a child born weighing less 
than 5.5 pounds or to deliver the child six weeks prematurely.”  
Id.  See also Thaddeus M. Baklinski, Study:  Women Who Use Birth Control Pill 1.5 Times More 
Likely to Develop Bowel Disease, LifeSiteNews.com, Mar. 13, 2009, http://www.lifesitenews. 
com/ldn/2009/mar/09031311.html (“women who use the pill are one and a half times 
more likely to develop Crohn’s disease (CD) or ulcerative colitis (UC) than women who 
have not used oral contraceptives.”); Catholic News Service, Birth-Control Pill is Linked to 
Male Infertility, Says Vatican Paper, Jan. 5, 2009, http://www.catholicnews.com/data/ 
briefs/cns/20090105.htm (explaining that environmental damage caused by the pill is 
contributing to male infertility and is creating sexual abnormalities in fish and other water-
dwelling creatures exposed to sewage containing estrogen and artificial hormones); 
Abortion-Causing Birth Control Patch Manufacturer Faces Class-Action Lawsuit, 
LifeSiteNews.com, July 27, 2005, http://www.lifesitenews.com/ldn/2005/jul/05072703. 
html (noting that ten women who suffered strokes or serious blood clots filed a class-action 
lawsuit against Ortho McNeil, maker of the Ortho Evra birth control patch); Birth Control 
Pill Raises Heart Attack Risk 100%, July 12, 2005, LifeSiteNews.com, 
http://www.lifesitenews.com/ldn/2005/jul/05071207.html (“women are at 100% greater 
risk of heart attack and stroke with the ‘low-dose’ pill, especially for those women with 
pre-existing medical conditions.”); Woman Sues “Birth Control” Patch Manufacturer for 
Pulmonary Embolism, Sept. 13, 2005, LifeSiteNews.com, http://www.lifesitenews.com/ldn/ 
2005/sep/05091303.html (during a twelve month period, the FDA acknowledged forty-
four “serious injuries or deaths” associated with Ortho Evra). 
22 Walter L. Larimore & Joseph B. Stanford, Postfertilization Effects of Oral Contraceptives 
and Their Relationship to Informed Consent, 9 ARCH. FAM. MED., Feb. 2000, 126, 126, available at 
http://archfami.ama-assn.org/cgi/reprint/9/2/126 (follow “Begin manual download” 
hyperlink) (last visited Sept. 23, 2009). 
23 See Walter L. Larimore, The Growing Debate About the Abortifacient Effect of the Birth 
Control Pill and the Principle of the Double Effect, ETERNAL PERSPECTIVE MINISTRIES, Oct. 1, 
2004, http://www.epm.org/artman2/publish/prolife_birth_control_pill/The_Growing_ 
Debate_About_the_Abortifacient_Effect_of_the_Birth_Control_Pill_and_the_Principle_of_ 
the_Double_Effect.shtml. 
 Dr. Larimore states that: 
Both proponents and opponents seem to agree that the risk of an 
abortifacient effect with intrauterine contraceptive devices (IUDs), the 
progesterone–only pills (POP), Norplant (subcutaneously implanted 
progesterone rods) and “emergency contraception”(sic) or “the 
morning after pills” are such that, in general, it would be unethical to 
use or prescribe these products for birth control. 
Id. 
 In November 2008, Fertility and Sterility published the pro-choice American Society for 
Reproductive Medicine (“ASRM”) statement entitled, “Hormonal contraception:  recent 
advances and controversies[,]” a statement conceding that oral contraceptives can operate 
by modification of the endometrium, preventing implantation.  Ellen M. Rice, American 
Society of Reproductive Medicine Statement Confirms the Pill Causes Abortion, 
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can operate by blocking ovulation or by manipulating the mucus lining 
the cervix, but it can also alter the endometrium reducing the likelihood 
of implantation.24  As a further example, the individual product 
information for Ortho’s Ortho-Cept, Syntex’s six varieties of 
contraceptive pills, Wyeth’s Lo/Ovral, Ovral, Nordette and Triphasil, 
and Organon’s Desogen indicates that these pills can function by 
changing the lining of the uterus in a way to prevent implantation.25  
Likewise, Plan-B, a medication designed to be used within seventy-two 
hours after unprotected sex or the failure of a contraceptive method, is 
“believed to act” as an emergency contraceptive that “may inhibit 
implantation . . . .”26  The Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) 
concedes that Plan-B may “work by preventing fertilization of an egg 
(the uniting of sperm with the egg) or by preventing attachment 
(implantation) to the uterus (womb), which usually occurs beginning 
seven days after release of an egg from the ovary.”27 
RU-486, sold under the brand names of Mifeprex or Early Option 
and under the generic name of Mifepristone, is an artificial steroid that, 
when taken with a prostaglandin, ultimately causes a miscarriage.28  
Jennifer E. Spreng explains that “mifepristone operates to terminate the 
pregnancy by detaching the embryo or fetus from the uterine wall where 
it had previously implanted, and the [misoprostol] then induces 
contractions to expel the fetus and other products of conception from the 
uterus[;]” this can be accomplished up to forty-nine days’ gestation.29  
Larimore and Stanford conclude that: 
                                                                                                             
LifeSiteNews.com, Dec. 12, 2008, http://www.lifesitenews.com/ldn/2008/dec/08121206. 
html (last visited May 19, 2009). 
24 PHYSICIANS’ DESK REFERENCE 3367 (62d ed. Medical Economics Co. 2008). 
25 ALCORN, supra note 18, at 21–23. 
26 PHYSICIANS’ DESK REFERENCE, supra note 24, at 1056.  There has been some debate 
among scientists as to whether Plan-B can actually function as an abortifacient in spite of 
the medication’s label to this effect.  See Nicanor Pier Giorgio Austriaco, Is Plan B an 
Abortifacient?  A Critical Look at the Scientific Evidence, 7 NAT’L CATH. BIOETHICS Q. 703 
(2007) (presenting evidence that Plan-B does not produce abortive results).  But see Patrick 
Yeung et al., Letter to the Editor, 8 NAT’L CATH. BIOETHICS Q. 218 (2008) (refuting 
Austriaco’s claims). 
27 Food and Drug Administration, Plan B:  Questions and Answers, http://www.fda.gov/ 
Drugs/DrugSafety/PostmarketDrugSafetyInformationforPatientsandProviders/ucm10978
3.htm (last visited Aug. 16, 2009). 
28 RU486Facts.org, What is RU-486?, http://www.ru486facts.org/index.cfm?page= 
whatis (last visited Aug. 16, 2009). 
29 Jennifer E. Spreng, Pharmacists and the ‘Duty’ to Dispense Emergency Contraceptives, 23 
ISSUES L. & MED. 215, 218, 225 (2008).  Misoprostol is a type of prostaglandin.  
WebMD.com, Information and Resources:  Misoprostol, http://www.webmd.com/a–to–z–
guides/misoprostol (last visited Aug. 16, 2009). 
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Despite the evidence, which suggests that 
postfertilization effects for OCs are operational at least 
some of the time, and the fact that a postfertilization 
mechanism for OCs is described in the Physicians’ Desk 
Reference, in Drug Facts and Comparisons, and in most 
standard gynecologic, family practice, nursing, and 
public health textbooks, we anecdotally find that few 
physicians or patients are aware of this possibility.30 
Thus, the potential for medicines labeled contraceptives to function 
by destroying a living and developing human zygote or embryo means 
that anyone who has moral reservations about surgical abortions may 
have the same reservations about chemical abortions.31  In fact, objecting 
pharmacists may take issue not only with dispensing abortifacients (and 
perhaps drugs used in euthanasia or capital punishment settings32), but 
with interfacing with them at all, as referring a patient or transferring a 
prescription would make them complicit in activity they find highly 
immoral.33 
Moral opposition among healthcare providers to abortion is not a 
recent development.34  Dr. James Hitchcock explains that opposition to 
abortion in the United States was “particularly strong” as early as the 
nineteenth century and that by the middle of that century, scientific 
research revealed that human life begins at conception, thereby 
discrediting as arbitrary the prevailing notion that human life begins at 
quickening.35  It was this scientific research—not “religious 
opposition”—that “was largely responsible for the stricter position on 
abortion.”36  Indeed, an effort began in the 1840s to completely prohibit 
abortion, which had come to be viewed as “the wanton taking of human 
                                                 
30 Larimore & Stanford, supra note 22, at 130. 
31 Cf. text accompanying note 22 (explaining that for those who believe that life begins at 
conception, a medicine that interrupts development subsequent to conception can be 
morally problematic).  An abortifacient is “a substance that causes pregnancy to end 
prematurely and causes an abortion.”  MedicineNet.com, Definition of Abortifacient, 
http://www.medterms.com/script/main/art.asp?articlekey=10912 (last visited Aug. 16, 
2009). 
32 See Jessica J. Nelson, Freedom of Choice for Everyone:  The Need for Conscience Clause 
Legislation for Pharmacists, 3 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 139, 140–41, 163 (2005) (discussing how 
pharmacists may object to certain medications because of their medical implications or for 
the reasons they will be used). 
33  Id. at 166. 
34  James Hitchcock, Respect for Life and the Health Care Professions:  A Historical Survey, in 
HUMAN LIFE AND HEALTH CARE ETHICS 45, 46 (James Bopp, Jr. ed., 1985). 
35  Id.  In fact, opposition to abortion pre-dates the nineteenth century as the English 
common law condemned abortion.  Id. at 45–46. 
36  Id. at 46. 
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life,” and the primary catalysts behind this endeavor were physicians, not 
clergy.37  Furthermore, as the medical profession improved in the 
nineteenth century, “physicians [became] unwilling to simply provide 
services on demand but wished to impose standards of ethical and 
scientific judgment on their work.”38 
Thus, healthcare practitioners’ objections to abortion are real and 
deep-rooted.39  Medical evidence makes it clear that contraceptives of 
different types can have abortive effects on a human embryo, explaining 
why pharmacists may object to interfacing with these drugs.40  For 
anyone who believes that human life begins at conception, providing a 
drug that can possibly destroy an embryo is essentially the facilitation of 
killing a human being.41 
B. Conscientious Objection in the Military and in the Medical Profession 
1. Conscientious Objection throughout the History of the U.S. Military 
Conscientious objection has deep roots in American history, 
particularly in the context of the military, where the government has 
treated genuine moral objection with respect.42  In fact, Stephen M. Kohn 
                                                 
37  Id. 
38  Id.  Hitchcock observes that: 
Professionalization, which in the nineteenth century served to restrict 
medical practice by forbidding acts deemed unprofessional or 
unethical, now serves to remove more and more of those restrictions.  
Although professionalization in the Victorian age was accompanied by 
humanitarian sentiment, in the end the spirit of professionalization is 
independent of moral values.  The tendency to define professional 
ethics in terms of professional practice often permits technical 
possibilities alone to define the limits of action.  Put another way, the 
moral practice of health care professionals always requires the infusion 
of values from outside the profession itself, and individual 
professionals may either be “ahead of” or “behind” public opinion on 
such issues.  Health care professionals’ acceptance of the legitimacy, 
even the desirability, of practices previously considered abhorrent was 
made possible by the collapse of a socially accepted moral consensus 
over the past twenty years, leaving an impersonal, largely technical 
standard of practice dominant. 
Id. at 48. 
39 See text accompanying note 35 (explaining that opposition to abortion within the U.S. 
medical community stretches back to the early nineteenth century). 
40 See supra notes 19–33 and accompanying text (explaining that contraceptives can act as 
abortifacients, making them potentially objectionable to pharmacists on moral grounds). 
41 Cf. text accompanying note 22 (explaining that for those who believe that life begins at 
conception, a medicine that interrupts development subsequent to conception can be 
morally problematic). 
42 See infra notes 43–66 and accompanying text (discussing conscientious objection in 
America from its colonial period to the present).  Spreng notes that: 
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relates that conscientious objection stretches back to America’s colonial 
days.43  For instance, the colonies of Massachusetts, New Hampshire, 
North Carolina, South Carolina, Virginia, and New York—because of 
their sizable pacifist populations—recognized conscientious objection to 
military service.44  Rhode Island was the first colony to grant a 
fundamental right of religious liberty and eventually passed a 
conscientious objection law that exempted from active military duty “all 
those who for reasons of conscience could not ‘train, arm, rally to fight, 
to kill.’”45  Also, a conscientious objector exemption was among the first 
pieces of legislation passed by the Continental Congress in 1775.46  This 
right was paramount even in the most perilous of circumstances, as 
during the impending invasion of Philadelphia by the British.47  Thus, 
                                                                                                             
[c]onscience clauses . . . are as fixed a star in American law as 
McCullough v. Maryland—or maybe even more so.  Statutory 
exemptions from otherwise generally applicable laws—attendance at 
the services of the relevant state’s established church—existed as early 
as 1675.  Prior to the Revolutionary War, many of the colonies 
extended exemptions from oath taking, tax collection for the 
established church, and military conscription. 
Jennifer E. Spreng, Conscientious Objectors Behind the Counter:  Statutory Defenses to Tort 
Liability for Failure to Dispense Contraceptives, 1 ST. LOUIS U. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 337, 372 
(2008) (footnotes omitted). 
43 STEPHEN M. KOHN, JAILED FOR PEACE:  THE HISTORY OF AMERICAN DRAFT LAW 
VIOLATORS, 1658–1985 9–12  (Greenwood Press 1986). 
44 Id. at 9–10.  Delaware, Pennsylvania, New York, and New Hampshire eventually 
recognized conscientious objection as an absolute right in their individual constitutions in 
1776, 1776, 1777, and 1784, respectively.  Id. at 10.  Peter Brock explains that Pennsylvania 
was well-known for its pacifistic government and remained “virtually unarmed for some 
seven decades[,]” with an act of 1673 fully exempting genuine objectors from military 
service but requiring them to provide civilian service in the event of invasion.  PETER 
BROCK, VARIETIES OF PACIFISM:  A SURVEY FROM ANTIQUITY TO THE OUTSET OF THE 
TWENTIETH CENTURY 31, 34 (Syracuse Univ. Press 1998).  Interestingly, James Madison 
proposed including a right of conscientious objection in the Bill of Rights that would have 
read:  “‘no person religiously scrupulous of bearing arms shall be compelled to render 
military service in person.’”  KOHN, supra note 43, at 10–11.  While the clause met approval 
in the House, it failed in the Senate.  Id. at 11. 
45 KOHN, supra note 43, at 7–8.  The law in its entirety read: 
Noe person nor persons [within this colony], that is or hereafter shall 
be persuaded in his, their conscience, or consciences [and by him or 
them declared], that he nor they cannot nor ought not to trayne, to 
learned to fight, nor to war, nor kill any person or persons . . . nor shall 
suffer any punishment, fine, distraint, penalty nor imprisonment. 
Id. at 8. 
46 Id. at 10. 
47 Id.  Likewise, the governing body of Pennsylvania refused to alter its commitment to a 
right of conscientious objection at the start of the French and Indian War, “even if the very 
existence of the colony was at stake.”  Id. at 9.  Kohn reiterates the sentiment of a 
Pennsylvania legislator who remarked that “‘[w]e have taken every step in our power, 
consistent with the just rights of the freemen . . . .  Those who would give up essential 
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most Revolutionary War objectors were exempted from military service, 
and jail terms for those not exempted were quite short.48 
During the Civil War, President Abraham Lincoln pardoned some 
Quakers who had been inducted or jailed, and the Confederacy included 
an objector provision in its draft law.49  In general, Lincoln’s 
administration offered exemptions to objectors, requiring them to pay 
money instead of serve, and these exemptions initially did not 
differentiate between genuine objectors and those who objected for less 
conscientious reasons.50  The Confederacy allowed objectors to pay their 
way out of service too.51 
During World War I, 3500 individuals obtained legal objector 
exemptions and during World War II, around 37,000 of the 72,354 men 
who applied for objector exemptions were assigned to noncombatant 
army service or civilian work camps.52  In 1952, the number of inductees 
                                                                                                             
liberty to purchase a little temporary safety, deserve neither liberty nor safety.’”  Id. at 9.  
By the mid-nineteenth century, the militia system was so degraded that inductions were 
not enforced and refusals not penalized.  BROCK, supra note 44, at 61. 
 George Washington wrote to the Pennsylvania Council of Safety: 
As there is not the least doubt at present, that the principal object of 
the enemy is to get possession of the City of Philadelphia, it is 
absolutely necessary, that every person able to bear arms [except such 
as are Conscientiously scrupulous against in every case] should give 
their personal service. 
KOHN, supra note 43, at 10. 
 Nelson, in quoting Professor Lynn Wardle, observes that “the founders recognized 
that ‘[i]f you demand that a man betray his conscience, you have eliminated the only moral 
basis for his fidelity to the rule of law, and have destroyed the foundation for all civic 
virtue.’”  Nelson, supra note 32, at 144. 
48 KOHN, supra note 43, at 10. 
49 Id. at 20.  
50 BROCK, supra note 44, at 70. 
51 Id. at 71. 
52 KOHN, supra note 43, at 25, 46.  In fact, conscientious objectors from World War I were 
eligible again for exemption in World War II.  Id. at 49.  The Draft Act of 1917 exempted 
from service those affiliated with well-known pacifist religious denominations opposed to 
all war.  Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 443 n.8 (1971).  The Selective Training and 
Service Act of 1940 recognized “religious scruples against bearing arms . . . .”  Girouard v. 
United States, 328 U.S. 61, 66 (1946). 
 Before his ascendancy to the Supreme Court in 1925, Harlan Fiske Stone contributed 
an article to the Columbia University Quarterly in which he addressed conscientious 
objection during World War I.  Harlan Fiske Stone, The Conscientious Objector, 21 COL. 
UNIV. Q. 253 (1919), available at http://www.archive.org/details/columbiauniversi21 
newyuoft (click on “PDF” under “View the book”) (last visited Aug. 16, 2009).  Stone notes 
that During World War I, genuine conscientious objectors could be permitted to accept 
employment as furloughed soldiers on select farms, although any pay earned beyond the 
amount they would receive as soldiers had to be given to the civilian branch of the Red 
Cross.  Id. at 258.  In some rare cases, a conscientious objector could be sent to Europe to aid 
in reconstruction efforts.  Id. 
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who received conscientious objector status was more than ten times the 
percentage of those who had applied for this status during World War II, 
and by 1960, the number of exempted objectors reached 18.24%.53  By 
1972, there were more men exempted from service than there were 
inducted into it.54  The current Selective Service Act provides an objector 
exemption for those, “by reason of religious training and belief, [are] 
conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any form.”55 
In the 1946 case, Girouard v. United States,56 the Supreme Court 
decided whether citizenship could be denied to a Canadian who refused 
to commit to potential combatant military duty despite Congress’s 
requirement that new citizens pledge an oath to defend the United 
States.57  The Court held that Congress has allowed citizens to do their 
duty in both combatant and non-combatant capacities, and that “[t]his 
respect by Congress over the years for the conscience of those having 
religious scruples against bearing arms is cogent evidence of the 
meaning of the oath.”58 
The case United States v. Seeger59 brought before the Court the 
question whether a literal belief in a Supreme Being was necessary to 
satisfy the exemption provision of the Universal Military Training and 
Service Act or if mere religious faith was adequate.60  The Court 
concluded that a “sincere and meaningful belief which occupies in the 
life of its possessor a place parallel to that filled by the God of those 
admittedly qualifying for the exemption” was sufficient.61  The question 
as to what exactly constitutes religious belief confronted the Court in 
Welsh v. United States.62  The Court reasoned that deeply and sincerely 
held beliefs that are purely ethical or moral, but that conscientiously 
compel a person to refrain from war, are analogous to religious beliefs in 
                                                 
53 KOHN, supra note 43, at 70. 
54 Id. at 92. 
55 50 U.S.C. app. § 456(j) (2006). 
56 Girouard, 328 U.S. at 61–63. 
57 The Court reversed the denial of the Canadian’s citizenship.  Id. at 69–70.  
58 Id. at 66–67.  In addition, the Court noted that “[t]he victory for freedom of thought 
recorded in our Bill of Rights recognizes that in the domain of conscience there is a moral 
power higher than the State.  Throughout the ages men have suffered death rather than 
subordinate their allegiance to God to the authority of the State.” Id. at 68. 
 The Court observed that “[o]ver the years, Congress has meticulously respected that 
tradition [of honoring conscientious objection] and even in time of war has sought to 
accommodate the military requirements to the religious scruples of the individual.”  Id. at 
69. 
59 380 U.S. 163 (1965). 
60 Id. at 165–66. 
61 Id. at 176. 
62 398 U.S. 333, 335 (1970). 
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God.63  The Court affirmed that beliefs not deeply held or of a political or 
pragmatic nature are inadequate to garner exemption.64  In siding with a 
conscientious objector in Gillette v. United States,65 Justice Thurgood 
Marshall explained that Congress has recognized both the value of 
conscientious action to the community and the notion that “fundamental 
principles of conscience and religious duty may sometimes override the 
demands of the secular state.”66 
The chief lesson of this history is that while the Constitution does not 
provide a right to be exempt from military service and Congress retains 
                                                 
63 Id. at 340.  In his concurrence, Justice Harlan explained that the Court essentially 
eliminated “the statutorily required religious content for a conscientious objector 
exemption.”  Id. at 345. 
64 Id. at 342–43. 
65 401 U.S. 437 (1971). 
66 Id. at 445.  The Gillette Court held that Congress intended to exempt those who 
opposed all war, not select wars.  Id. at 447.  Stone contends that: 
at least in those countries where the political theory obtains that the 
ultimate end of the state is the highest good of its citizens, both morals 
and sound policy require that the state should not violate the 
conscience of the individual.  All our history gives confirmation to the 
view that liberty of conscience has a moral and social value which 
makes it worthy of preservation at the hands of the state.  So deep in 
its significance and vital, indeed, is it to the integrity of man’s moral 
and spiritual nature that nothing short of the self-preservation of the 
state should warrant its violation; and it may well be questioned 
whether the state which preserves its life by a settled policy of 
violation of the conscience of the individual will not in fact ultimately 
lose it by the process. 
Stone, supra note 52, at 269. 
 Furthermore, Stone argues that: 
there may be and probably is a very radical distinction between 
compelling a citizen to refrain from acts which he regards as moral but 
which the majority of his fellow citizens and the law regard as immoral 
or unwholesome to the life of the state on the one hand, and 
compelling him on the other to do affirmative acts which he regards as 
unconscientious and immoral.  The action of the state in compelling 
the citizen to refrain from doing an act which he regards as moral and 
conscientious does not in most instances which are likely to occur do 
violence to his conscience; but conscience is violated if he is coerced 
into doing an act which is opposed to his deepest convictions of right 
and wrong.  The traditional view of the common law that right 
motives are no defense for crime and should not stay the hand of the 
law gives very little clue, therefore, to the sound method of dealing 
with the conscientious objector to war, in the realm of either morals or 
policy.  However rigorous the state may be in repressing the 
commission of acts which are regarded as injurious to the state, it may 
well stay its hand before it compels the commission of acts which 
violate the conscience. 
Id. at 268–69. 
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the power to compel an objector to serve,67 the U.S. government has 
honored the sacredness of individual conscience, even at the risk of 
reduced military strength at times of critical need for manpower (most 
notably during the Revolutionary War).68  Thus, by analogy, the idea that 
government should respect the consciences of medical professionals, 
particularly pharmacists, should not be seen as foreign or contrary to 
American sensibilities.69 
2. Conscientious Objection in the Medical Profession in Twentieth and 
Twenty-First Century America 
a. The States 
The right of conscience is also important to the medical community 
as implied by the fact that more than thirty-five percent of pharmacists 
say they would refuse to dispense an abortifacient with as many as forty-
five percent in certain regions of the U.S. saying they would refuse.70  
While an examination of every state’s current right-of-conscience 
exemptions for medical workers is beyond the scope of this Note, several 
examples will suffice.  Fifteen states provide conscience protection that 
may explicitly or implicitly benefit pharmacists and even grant them a 
defense to civil liability in some cases.71  South Dakota’s law is one of the 
most generous conscience laws currently in force.72  At the other end of 
                                                 
67 Georgia Chudoba, Note, Conscience in America:  The Slippery Slope of Mixing Morality 
with Medicine, 36 SW. L.J. 85, 93 (2007). 
68 See supra note 47 and accompanying text (noting that conscientious objection was 
honored even during the impending invasion of Philadelphia during the Revolutionary 
War and likewise by the colony of Pennsylvania at the beginning of the French and Indian 
War). 
69 Cf. supra note 66 and accompanying text (explaining that the Supreme Court has 
acknowledged Congress’s recognition of the value of conscientious action to the 
democratic community). 
70 Spreng, supra note 29, at 218. 
71 Spreng construes the statutory language of Arkansas, Colorado, Florida, Illinois, 
Mississippi, and Tennessee to provide exemption from civil liability to pharmacists.  Id. at 
218 n.20.  California, Maine, New York, North Carolina, Oregon, West Virginia, and 
Wyoming also offer conscience legislation that may benefit pharmacists.  Spreng, supra note 
42, at 374.  South Dakota has passed a broad conscience law for pharmacists, affording 
them protection from civil liability.  S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 36-11-70 (2008); Georgia’s 
conscience law also provides protection from civil liability.  GA. CODE ANN. § 16-12-142 
(2008).  Thus, approximately fifteen states offer conscience legislation of potential use to 
pharmacists as of 2008.  Spreng, supra note 42, at 374.  Nelson stated in 2005 that, every 
state except Vermont offered healthcare providers at least some conscience protections in at 
least some contexts.  Nelson, supra note 32, at 149.  For instance, forty-five states allowed 
healthcare providers to refuse to participate in abortions.  Id. at 142. 
72 The South Dakota law reads as follows: 
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the spectrum are “must-fill” laws, such as that of New Jersey.73  Spreng 
notes that New Jersey’s law features some loopholes pharmacists could 
exploit (similar loopholes exist in other must-fill laws).74  For instance, 
                                                                                                             
[n]o pharmacist may be required to dispense medication if there is 
reason to believe that the medication would be used to: 
(1) Cause an abortion; or 
(2) Destroy an unborn child [. . .]; or 
(3) Cause the death of any person by means of an assisted suicide, 
euthanasia, or mercy killing. 
No such refusal to dispense medication pursuant to this section may 
be the basis for any claim for damages against the pharmacist or the 
pharmacy of the pharmacist or the basis for any disciplinary, 
recriminatory, or discriminatory action against the pharmacist. 
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 36-11-70 (2008). 
73 The New Jersey law provides that: 
a. A pharmacy practice site has a duty to properly fill lawful 
prescriptions for prescription drugs or devices that it carries for 
customers, without undue delay, despite any conflicts of employees to 
filling a prescription and dispensing a particular prescription drug or 
device due to sincerely held moral, philosophical or religious beliefs. 
b. If a pharmacy practice site does not have in stock a prescription 
drug or device that it carries, and a patient presents a prescription for 
that drug or device, the pharmacy practice site shall offer: 
(1) to obtain the drug or device under its standard expedited ordering 
procedures; or 
(2) to locate a pharmacy that is reasonably accessible to the patient and 
has the drug or device in stock, and transfer the prescription there in 
accordance with the pharmacy practice site’s standard procedures. 
The pharmacy practice site shall perform the patient’s chosen option 
without delay. If the patient so requests, the pharmacist shall return an 
unfilled prescription to the patient. 
c. If a pharmacy practice site does not carry a prescription drug or 
device, and a patient presents a prescription for that drug or device, 
the pharmacy practice site shall offer to locate a pharmacy that is 
reasonably accessible to the patient and has the drug or device in stock. 
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 45:14-67.1 (West 2008). 
74 Spreng, supra note 29, at 264.  Washington’s statute requires pharmacies to stock and 
distribute prescription and non-prescription medications; the pharmacist may return or 
transfer medications only if he has made a good-faith effort to stock and distribute the 
drug.  Id.  Massachusetts, Nevada, and New Jersey feature must-fill laws; Pennsylvania 
requires that pharmacists not abandon patients and that pharmacies “ensure timely access” 
to contraceptives.  NATIONAL WOMEN’S LAW CENTER, PHARMACY REFUSALS:  STATE LAWS, 
REGULATIONS, AND POLICIES, (2009), http://www.nwlc.org/pdf/PharmacyRefusalPolicies 
January2009.pdf).  The pharmacy boards of six states (Alabama, Delaware, New York, 
North Carolina, Oregon, and Texas) have interpreted professional obligations so as to 
prohibit pharmacists from obstructing access or refusing to refer or transfer prescriptions, 
but these interpretations are not legally binding.  Id.  California has a must-fill law, but it 
provides an exemption for an objecting pharmacist.  CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 733 (West 
2008).  Maine also has a must-fill law, but it too provides a conscience exemption.  ME. REV. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1903 (2008).  Illinois, while providing some protection and liability 
immunity for healthcare workers (including pharmacists), has a conflicting must-fill law.  
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this law applies only to prescriptions, not over- or behind-the-counter 
medicines; it applies to pharmacies and not pharmacists; and it is not 
facially neutral in how it targets the religious beliefs of pharmacists; 
Spreng claims that this law is “not a sufficient basis in which to ground a 
duty to sell a non-prescription drug.”75 
Illinois, a state that makes for a good study of the conscience law 
controversy, features the Right of Conscience Act, the purpose of which 
is to ensure protection for the consciences and job security of health care 
workers.76  The court in Vandersand v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,77 held that 
the Right of Conscience Act covers pharmacists because dispensing 
medicines “constitutes health care services.”78 
However, in 2005, then-Governor of Illinois Rod Blagojevich issued 
an Emergency Amendment to part of the state’s administrative code that 
obligates Division I pharmacies to dispense contraceptives.79  This 
                                                                                                             
See infra notes 76–85 and accompanying text (discussing pertinent Illinois laws).  Jessica D. 
Yoder notes that from a practical perspective, stocking contraceptives may not be a wise 
business decision as there may be little demand for them at a particular pharmacy or their 
presence at the pharmacy may repel potential customers.  Jessica D. Yoder, Note, 
Pharmacists’ Right of Conscience:  Strategies for Showing Respect for Pharmacists’ Beliefs While 
Maintaining Adequate Care for Patients, 41 VAL. U. L. REV. 975, 1014–15 (2006).  She explains 
that with about 10,000 drugs on the market, pharmacies have to decide which of those will 
be most profitable and that the cost of stocking a drug for which there is little demand may 
be higher than the losses from turning away the few people who might want it.  Id. at 1015. 
75 Spreng, supra note 29, at 263.  In analyzing laws that allegedly impose a duty to 
dispense, Spreng points out that there is some key language to look for.  Id. at 262.  First, 
does the law target pharmacies or pharmacists?  Id.  Obviously, one that addresses only 
pharmacies does not create a duty to dispense for individual pharmacists.  Id.  Secondly, 
does the law deal only with prescription medications?  Id.  If so, a pharmacist may still be 
able to avoid interfacing with Plan-B because it is now most commonly available behind-
the-counter like many cough syrups and may not require a prescription (of course, this 
does not help a pharmacist avoid dispensing prescription-only drugs used in euthanasia or 
execution settings).  Id. at 238, 262.  Finally, does the language of the statute expressly or by 
implication target religion or religious believers?  Id. at 262.  If so, the law could be attacked 
for violating the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment or similar state provisions.  
Id. 
76 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. 70/2 (2008).  The law exempts healthcare providers from civil or 
criminal liability for refusing to “perform, assist, counsel, suggest, recommend, refer or 
participate in any way in any particular form of health care service which is contrary to the 
conscience of such physician or health care personnel.”  Id. § 70/4. 
77 525 F. Supp. 2d 1052 (C.D. Ill. 2007). 
78 Id. at 1057.  Vandersand involved a suit by a pharmacist against his employer, Wal-
Mart, after it placed him on leave without pay because he refused to dispense the morning-
after pill.  Id. at 1053. 
79 The pertinent part of ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 68, § 1330.91(j) (2008), reads: 
1) Upon receipt of a valid, lawful prescription for a contraceptive, a 
retail pharmacy serving the general public must dispense the 
contraceptive, or a suitable alternative permitted by the prescriber, 
to the patient or the patient’s agent without delay, consistent with 
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the normal timeframe for filling any other prescription, subject to 
the remaining provisions of this subsection (j).  If the contraceptive, 
or a suitable alternative, is not in stock, the pharmacy must obtain 
the contraceptive under the pharmacy’s standard procedures for 
ordering contraceptive drugs not in stock, including the procedures 
of any entity that is affiliated with, owns, or franchises the 
pharmacy.  However, if the contraceptive, or a suitable alternative, 
is not in stock and the patient prefers, the prescription must be 
transferred to a local pharmacy of the patient’s choice under the 
pharmacy’s standard procedures for transferring prescriptions for 
contraceptive drugs, including the procedures of any entity that is 
affiliated with, owns, or franchises the pharmacy.  Under any 
circumstances an unfilled prescription for contraceptive drugs must 
be returned to the patient if the patient so directs. 
2) Each retail pharmacy serving the general public shall use its best 
efforts to maintain adequate stock of emergency contraception to the 
extent it continues to sell contraception (nothing in this subsection 
(j)(2) prohibits a pharmacy from deciding not to sell contraception).  
Whenever emergency contraception is out-of-stock at a particular 
pharmacy and a prescription for emergency contraception is 
presented, the pharmacist or another pharmacy registrant shall 
attempt to assist the patient, at the patient’s choice and request, in 
making arrangements to have the emergency contraception 
prescription filled at another pharmacy under the pharmacy’s 
standard procedures for transferring prescriptions for contraceptive 
drugs, including the procedures of any entity that is affiliated with, 
owns or franchises the pharmacy. 
3) Dispensing Protocol—In the event that a licensed pharmacist who 
objects to dispensing emergency contraception (an “objecting 
pharmacist”) is presented with a prescription for emergency 
contraception, the retail pharmacy serving the general public shall 
use the following dispensing protocol: 
A) All other pharmacists, if any, then present at the location where 
the objecting pharmacist works (the “dispensing pharmacy”) 
shall first be asked to dispense the emergency contraception (any 
pharmacist that does not object to dispensing these medications is 
referred to as a “non-objecting pharmacist”). 
B) If there is an objecting pharmacist and no non-objecting 
pharmacist is then available at the dispensing pharmacy, any 
pharmacy (the “remote pharmacy”) or other non-objecting 
pharmacist shall provide “remote medication order processing” 
(RMOP) to the dispensing pharmacy.  RMOP includes any and all 
services that a licensed pharmacist may provide, as well as 
authorizing a non-pharmacist registrant at the dispensing 
pharmacy, to dispense the emergency contraception to the patient 
under the remote supervision of a non-objecting pharmacist.  For 
purposes of this subsection (j) and the Pharmacy Practice Act, a 
registered pharmacy technician is authorized to engage in RMOP 
involving emergency contraception. 
Id.  Division I pharmacies are those that engage in general community pharmacy practice 
and that are open to, or offer pharmacy service to, the general public.  ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 
68, § 1330.5 (2006). 
Duffy: Good Medicine:  Why Pharmacists Should Be Prescribed a Right of C
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2010
526 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44 
amendment was the crux of Menges v. Blagojevch,80 a suit against the 
governor and other state officials by Walgreens pharmacists who lost 
their jobs for not abiding by the amendment’s provisions.81  The Menges 
court denied the governor’s motion to dismiss the pharmacists’ 
complaint and held that the pharmacists’ allegations substantiated a 
claim.82  The court further explained that the amendment was passed in 
response to pharmacists who had moral and religious objections to 
dispensing emergency contraceptives and that Blagojevich “reaffirmed 
publicly his position that the Rule was directed at individual 
pharmacists who object to dispensing certain drugs on moral grounds[,]” 
and he stated that such pharmacists “should find another profession.”83 
The court questioned the amendment’s constitutional validity, 
noting that even a facially neutral law—like the amendment—cannot 
have the hidden purpose of attacking religious beliefs, lest the Free 
Exercise Clause of the First Amendment be violated.84  The court held 
that the amendment could fail strict scrutiny analysis for 
unconstitutionally targeting pharmacists engaging in free exercise rights 
because Governor Blagojevich’s comments suggested that the law was 
intended to coerce objecting pharmacists and because the law did not 
cover hospitals or emergency rooms and burdens pharmacists in ways it 
does not burden pharmacies.85 
                                                 
80 451 F. Supp. 2d 992 (C.D. Ill. 2006). 
81 Id. at 998. 
82 Id. at 1005, 1003. 
83 Id. at 997. 
84 Id. at 999–1000.  The First Amendment of the United States Constitution provides in 
part that “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . .”  U.S. CONST. amend. I.  Yoder points out that 
Illinois’ must-fill law’s directive that emergency contraception be dispensed “‘without 
delay’” could hinder pharmacists’ duties to “screen for drug-drug interactions, drug-food 
interactions, drug-allergy interactions, incorrect dosage, incorrect duration, and clinical 
abuse or misuse, all of which naturally involve some ‘delay.’”  Yoder, supra note 74, at 1018. 
85 Menges, 451 F. Supp. 2d at 1000–02.  In December 2008, the Illinois Supreme Court 
held that two pharmacists had standing to bring a suit against Governor Blagojevich and 
several other Illinois state officials on a First Amendment claim.  Morr-Fitz v. Blagojevich, 
901 N.E.2d 373, 387 (Ill. 2008).  The pharmacists claimed that the Emergency Amendment 
burdened their free exercise of religion, was not narrowly tailored or the least restrictive 
means of serving a government interest, and was intended to coerce objecting pharmacists 
to fill Plan-B prescriptions despite their objections.  Id.  The court noted that “[c]ourts have 
specifically found that pharmacists and pharmacies in similar cases involving state 
regulation requiring the dispensing of Plan B contraception have sufficiently stated causes 
of action that could be considered by the judiciary.”  Id.  The court further explained that 
“[i]f a rule is facially neutral as to the text, a court must then look beyond the face of the 
rule to determine the true object of the statute,” and “[w]here the object of the rule is to 
infringe upon or restrict practices because of their religious motivation, the law is not 
neutral, and it is invalid unless it is justified by a compelling interest and is narrowly 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 44, No. 2 [2010], Art. 5
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol44/iss2/5
2010] Good Medicine 527 
The Supreme Court upheld a right-of-conscience clause for 
physicians in Doe v. Bolton,86 the companion case to Roe v. Wade.87  
While the Court struck down several provisions of Georgia’s criminal 
law dealing with abortion, it left intact a section providing that any 
physician or hospital staff member could, for moral or religious reasons, 
refuse to participate in an abortion procedure without civil or 
employment-related repercussions.88 
In sum, state law remains a cornucopia of provisions both friendly 
and hostile toward conscientious healthcare workers.89  Practically every 
state offers exemptions to those healthcare providers who object to 
participating in abortions or sterilizations.90  Consequently, a state’s 
desire to protect pharmacists’ consciences should not be seen as an 
unprecedented overture to the healthcare community in light of the 
conscience protection many states already offer to health practitioners.91 
b. The Federal Government 
Shortly after the Supreme Court produced its Roe v. Wade decision in 
1973, Congress passed the Church Amendment, which prohibits both 
coercing public officials to participate in acts contrary to their beliefs, 
particularly abortions and sterilizations, and discriminating against 
them.92  Granted, the power of the Act extends only as far as the funds 
attached to it.93 
                                                                                                             
tailored to advance that interest.”  Id. at 389 (citing Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. 
v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 533–34 (1993)). 
 On April 6, 2009, a Sangamon county judge temporarily barred the Governor of 
Illinois and other state officials from enforcing Blagojevich’s Emergency Amendment, 
holding that two Illinois pharmacists who refused to pledge to comply with the order had a 
meritorious claim and that the Emergency Amendment violated the state’s Right of 
Conscience Act.  Kathleen Gilbert, Illinois Judges [sic] Upholds Pharmacists’ Conscience Rights, 
LifeSiteNews.com, April 6, 2009, http://www.lifesitenews.com/ldn/2009/apr/09040604. 
html (last visited May 19, 2009). 
86 410 U.S. 179, 201 (1973). 
87 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
88 Bolton, 410 U.S. at 201, 205.  Spreng explains that “[f]ederal constitutional protection 
for religious liberty has waxed and waned in the past few decades, but the Supreme Court 
has consistently upheld federal and state statutory accommodations of religious practice 
and belief, including some analogous to pharmacist conscience clauses.”  Spreng, supra 
note 42, at 383 (footnotes omitted). 
89 See supra notes 71–75 and accompanying text (discussing conscience laws and must-
fill laws in the United States). 
90 See supra note 71 (explaining that almost every state offers at least some conscience 
protection in at least some contexts). 
91 See supra Part II.B.2.a (describing state conscience laws). 
92 Nelson, supra note 32, at 148.  The Act is named for Senator Frank Church, its sponsor.  
Id.  The Act reads, in part: 
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Per the Public Health Service Act, the federal government and any 
state or local government receiving federal funds is prohibited from 
discriminating against healthcare workers who refuse to participate in 
training for, provision of, or referral for abortions.94  In discussing a 
                                                                                                             
(b) Prohibition of public officials and public authorities from 
imposition of certain requirements contrary to religious beliefs or 
moral convictions.   
 The receipt of any grant, contract, loan, or loan guarantee under 
the Public Health Service Act [42 U.S.C. 201 et seq.], the Community 
Mental Health Centers Act [42 U.S.C. 2689 et seq], or the 
Developmental Disabilities Services and Facilities Construction Act [42 
U.S.C. 6000 et seq.] by any individual or entity does not authorize any 
court or any public official or other public authority to require— 
 (1) such individual to perform or assist in the performance of any 
sterilization procedure or abortion if his performance or assistance in 
the performance of such procedure or abortion would be contrary to 
his religious beliefs or moral convictions; or 
 (2) such entity to— 
  (A) make its facilities available for the performance of any 
sterilization procedure or abortion if the performance of such 
procedure or abortion in such facilities is prohibited by the entity on 
the basis of religious beliefs or moral convictions, or 
  (B) provide any personnel for the performance or assistance 
in the performance of any sterilization procedure or abortion if the 
performance or assistance in the performance of such procedure or 
abortion by such personnel would be contrary to the religious beliefs 
or moral convictions of such personnel. 
(c) Discrimination prohibition. 
 (1) No entity which receives a grant, contract, loan, or loan 
guarantee under the Public Health Service Act [42 U.S.C. 201 et seq.], 
the Community Mental Health Centers Act [42 U.S.C. 2689, or the 
Developmental Disabilities Services and Facilities Construction Act [42 
U.S.C. 6000 et seq.] after the date of enactment of this Act [enacted June 
18, 1973] may— 
  (A) discriminate in the employment, promotion, or 
termination of employment of any physician or other health care 
personnel, or 
  (B) discriminate in the extension of staff or other privileges 
to any physician or other health care personnel, because he performed 
or assisted in the performance of a lawful sterilization procedure or 
abortion, because he refused to perform or assist in the performance of 
such a procedure or abortion on the grounds that his performance or 
assistance in the performance of the procedure or abortion would be 
contrary to his religious beliefs or moral convictions, or because of his 
religious beliefs or moral convictions respecting sterilization 
procedures or abortions. 
42 U.S.C. § 300a-7 (2006). 
93 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 300a-7(b)–(e) (2006) (indicating that these sections of the U.S. Code 
apply to federally funded programs and entities). 
94 42 U.S.C. § 238n provides, in part, that: 
(a) In general 
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regulation in the state of Washington that would require objecting 
pharmacists to refer patients elsewhere, the district court in Stormans Inc. 
v. Selecky95 noted that “[f]ederal and state law provide a clear right to 
health care providers to not participate in abortion procedures.”96  
Further, as part of its Title X regulations, the federal government has 
prohibited requiring public or private persons to provide or pay for 
abortion services.97  In 2005, Congress passed the Hyde-Weldon 
Amendment as part of the Appropriations Bill for the Departments of 
Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education, thereby denying 
Title X funds to any federal agency or program and any state or local 
                                                                                                             
The Federal Government, and any State or local government that 
receives Federal financial assistance, may not subject any health care 
entity to discrimination on the basis that— 
(1) the entity refuses to undergo training in the performance of 
induced abortions, to require or provide such training, to perform such 
abortions, or to provide referrals for such training or such abortions; 
(2) the entity refuses to make arrangements for any of the activities 
specified in paragraph (1); or 
(3) the entity attends (or attended) a post-graduate physician training 
program, or any other program of training in the health professions, 
that does not (or did not) perform induced abortions or require, 
provide or refer for training in the performance of induced abortions, 
or make arrangements for the provision of such training. 
42 U.S.C. § 238n (2006). 
95 524 F. Supp. 2d 1245 (W.D. Wash. 2007), motion to stay injunction denied, 526 F.3d 406, 
408 (9th Cir. 2008), vacated and remanded, 571 F.3d 960, 964 (9th Cir. 2009), petition for 
rehearing en banc denied, Nos. 07-36039, 07-36040, 2009 WL 3448435, at *1 (9th Cir. Oct. 28, 
2009).  The Ninth Circuit held that the district court applied the wrong level of review to 
the must-fill law and that the injunction it issued was overbroad.  571 F.3d 960, 964.  
96 Id. at 1263–64.  The district court in Stormans granted a preliminary injunction pending 
appeal against regulations that would have prohibited a pharmacist from refusing to fill a 
prescription even if the pharmacist immediately referred the patient to another pharmacy.  
Id. at 1266.  Wendy Wright explains that over the past thirty-five years, the Department of 
Health and Human Services has held that programs it funds cannot discriminate against 
healthcare providers for refusing to participate in acts to which they object.  Wendy 
Wright, HHS Secretary Addresses Abortion Groups’ Lies, Seeks to Protect Pro-Life Doctors and 
Patients, CONCERNED WOMEN FOR AMERICA, Aug. 12, 2008, http://www.cwfa.org/ 
articledisplay.asp?id=15631&department=CWA&categoryid=freedom (last visited Aug. 16, 
2009). 
97 20 U.S.C. § 1688 (2006).  The statute provides that: 
[n]othing in this chapter shall be construed to require or prohibit any 
person, or public or private entity, to provide or pay for any benefit or 
service, including the use of facilities, related to an abortion.  Nothing 
in this section shall be construed to permit a penalty to be imposed on 
any person or individual because such person or individual is seeking 
or has received any benefit or service related to a legal abortion. 
Id. 
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program that discriminates against any healthcare entity that refuses to 
provide, pay for, provide coverage for, or refer for abortions.98 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides the clearest 
prohibition against discrimination based on religious beliefs and 
encompasses public and private actors.99  Thus, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) 
unequivocally states that employers may not “discharge any individual” 
or “discriminate against any individual . . . because of such individual’s 
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”100  The statute defines 
religion as “all aspects of religious observance and practice, as well as 
belief, unless an employer demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably 
accommodate to an employee’s or prospective employee’s religious 
observance or practice without undue hardship on the conduct of the 
employer’s business.”101  To illustrate, one of the claims put forward in 
Vandersand v. Wal-Mart Stores was religious discrimination in violation of 
Title VII.102  The court explained that “[a]n undue hardship is anything 
that imposes more than a de minimus [sic] burden on the employer” and 
that the pharmacist bringing the claim in the case would need to show 
that he “engages in . . . a religious observance . . . that conflicts with an 
employment requirement[,]” that he informed his employer of this 
observance, and that the observance was the employer’s basis for 
                                                 
98 Consolidated Appropriations Act Pub. L. No. 110-161, § 508(a)–(d), 121 Stat. 1844, 
2209 (2007).  The Amendment states: 
(1) None of the funds made available in this Act may be made 
available to a Federal agency or program, or to a State or local 
government, if such agency, program, or government subjects any 
institutional or individual health care entity to discrimination on the 
basis that the health care entity does not provide, pay for, provide 
coverage for, or refer for abortions. 
(2) In this subsection, the term “health care entity” includes an 
individual physician or other health care professional, a hospital, a 
provider-sponsored organization, a health maintenance organization, a 
health insurance plan, or any other kind of health care facility, 
organization, or plan. 
Id. 
99 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2006) (providing that failing or refusing to hire someone 
on account of religion is unlawful).  Amy Bergquist explains that: 
 [a]bsent legislation, the federal government has little influence 
over employment policies relating to religion.  The First Amendment 
constrains government employers, but it has a negligible effect on the 
policies of private employers . . . . Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 
restricts both private and public employers’ right to terminate, 
discipline, or refuse to hire employees on religious grounds. 
Bergquist supra, note 17, at 1078. 
100 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2006). 
101 Id. § 2000e(j). 
102 525 F. Supp. 2d 1052, 1053 (C.D. Ill. 2007). 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 44, No. 2 [2010], Art. 5
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol44/iss2/5
2010] Good Medicine 531 
adverse employment action.103  Thus, an objecting pharmacist, in order 
to have his or her moral objections accommodated, could not demand 
concessions that would impose an undue burden on the employer.104 
                                                 
103 Id. at 1055 (citing Reed v. Great Lakes Cos., 330 F.3d 931, 935 (7th Cir. 2003)).  The 
court held that Vandersand stated a claim and that it was not impossible for Wal-Mart to 
comply with Governor Blagojevich’s Emergency Amendment while also accommodating 
Vandersand because the amendment required pharmacies and not pharmacists 
individually to dispense contraceptives.  Id. at 1056.  The court in Menges also had to decide 
if the Governor’s amendment violated Title VII.  Menges v. Blagojevich, 451 F. Supp. 2d 
992, 1002–03 (C.D. Ill. 2006).  The court explained that “[a] rule that mandates religious 
discrimination by employers would conflict with Title VII and would be preempted” and 
that “[i]f the Plaintiffs can prove that the burden of accommodating their beliefs is so slight, 
then the Plaintiffs’ religious beliefs in opposition to Emergency Contraceptives may be 
within Title VII’s definition of religion.”  Id. at 1003. 
104 As an example, Maxine M. Harrington cites to Brener v. Diagnostic Ctr. Hosp., 671 
F.2d 141 (5th Cir. 1982), a case in which a pharmacist refused to work on the Sabbath.  
Maxine M. Harrington, The Ever-Expanding Health Care Conscience Clause:  The Quest for 
Immunity in the Struggle Between Professional Duties and Moral Beliefs, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 
779, 792 (2007).  The employer accommodated the pharmacist and traded his Saturday 
shifts.  Id.  Ultimately, when the pharmacist was unable to trade shifts on several religious 
holidays, the employer terminated him.  Id.  The pharmacist sued the employer for 
religious discrimination, but the court upheld the termination because the employer had 
made a reasonable attempt at accommodation.  Id.  The pharmacist’s demands disrupted 
the pharmacy’s work routines and lowered morale; hiring another pharmacist would have 
created an undue hardship on the employer.  Id. 
 Likewise, the accommodations sought by pharmacist Neil Noesen were, according to 
the Seventh Circuit, too burdensome.  Noesen v. Med. Staffing Network, Inc., 232 Fed. 
App’x 581, 584 (2007).  Although his employer, Wal-Mart, was able and willing to 
accommodate him to an extent, Noesen refused to answer telephone calls from individuals 
with birth control inquiries.  Id. at 583.  The Seventh Circuit held that “an accommodation 
that requires other employees to assume a disproportionate workload (or divert them from 
their regular work) is an undue hardship as a matter of law.”  Id. at 584–85. 
 On the other hand, in Hellinger v. Eckerd Corp., 67 F. Supp. 2d 1359 (S.D. Fla. 1999), 
the court held that a pharmacist’s employer had failed to reasonably accommodate his 
objection to selling condoms.  Harrington, supra at 792.  The employer claimed that hiring 
another pharmacist would be an undue burden, but the court “rejected as speculative the 
[employer’s] suggestion that asking customers to go to another register to pay for the 
condoms would cause a loss of customers, goodwill, and revenue.”  Id. at 792. 
 An example of a claim outside the pharmaceutical context comes from Am. Postal 
Workers Union v. Postmaster Gen., a case where two postal workers challenged the 
accommodations offered to them by the post office after they indicated that processing 
draft registration forms conflicted with their religious beliefs.  781 F.2d 772, 774–75 (9th Cir. 
1986).  The Ninth Circuit cited two cases, Anderson v. Gen. Dynamics Convair Aerospace Div., 
589 F.2d 397, 401 (9th Cir. 1979) (holding that the plaintiff employee established a prima 
facie case of religious discrimination and that the burden then shifted to the employer to 
prove that it made a good faith effort to accommodate the employee’s beliefs or to explain 
why it could not successfully do so), and Burns v. S. Pac. Transp. Co., 589 F.2d 403, 406 (9th 
Cir. 1979) (holding, in part, that “[o]nce the employer has made more than a negligible 
effort to accommodate the employee . . . and that effort is viewed by the worker as 
inadequate, the question becomes whether the further accommodation requested would 
constitute ‘undue hardship[]’”) in concluding that an employer must offer a reasonable 
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In August, 2008, the Department of Health and Human Services 
(“HHS”) issued a proposed rule that was intended to “ensure that 
Department funds do not support morally coercive or discriminatory 
practices or policies in violation of federal law” and “that recipients of 
Department funds know about their legal obligations under . . . 
nondiscrimination provisions . . . .”105  This proposal was published in 
the Federal Register on December 19, 2008, and took effect thirty days 
thereafter with certain components to be phased in by October 1, 2009.106 
In response to the American College of Obstetricians and 
Gynecologists’ new guidelines that could require a doctor to receive 
training for and actually perform abortions in order to be deemed 
competent, Secretary of HHS, Michael O. Leavitt, explained that federal 
law is unequivocal in its protection of the consciences of federally-
funded healthcare workers and asserted that compelling doctors or those 
who assist them to violate their consciences contravenes federal law.107 
The regulation issued by HHS is intended both to increase 
compliance with already existing federal laws that attach anti-
discrimination provisions to certain federal funds and to make clear that 
these rules apply to healthcare providers and the employees of recipients 
of certain HHS funds.108  Failure to comply with federal law could result 
in the termination of funding to the entity and a demand for the return of 
funds already paid while the entity was in violation.109  Although the 
regulation does not mention pharmacists specifically, it defines “health 
care entity” by adopting the definitions articulated in the Public Health 
Service Act and the Weldon Amendment, which include “other 
healthcare professional”—language that presumably encompasses 
pharmacists.110 
                                                                                                             
accommodation to an employee but that the employee in turn must be reasonable in 
accepting or refusing that accommodation.  Am. Postal Workers Union, 781 F.2d at 776.  In 
the case at hand, the post office made a reasonable accommodation and the employees’ 
declination stemmed not from a bona fide religious objection, but from a dislike for the 
new position.  Id. 
105 Ensuring that Department of Health and Human Services Funds Do Not Support 
Coercive or Discriminatory Policies or Practices in Violation of Federal Law, 73 Fed. Reg. 
50274 (proposed Aug. 26, 2008) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 88). 
106 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, News Release:  HHS Issues Final 
Regulation to Protect Health Care Providers from Discrimination, http://www.hhs.gov/ 
news/press/2008pres/12/20081218a.html (last visited Dec. 26, 2008). 
107 Posting of Michael O. Leavitt to Physician Conscience Blog III, http://archive.hhs. 
gov/secretarysblog/my_weblog/physician_conscience/index.html (Aug. 21, 2008). 
108 Id. 
109 Id. 
110 See 45 C.F.R. § 88.2 (2009) (defining “health care entity”).  The Public Health Service 
Act defines health care entity as an “individual physician, a postgraduate physician 
training program, [or] a participant in a program of training in the health professions”  42 
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On February 27, 2009, President Barack Obama’s administration took 
steps to rescind this conscience rule, claiming that although the rule was 
intended to bring clarity to current federal law, it instead has created 
confusion and compromises access by women to “care they need,” 
including “family planning[.]”111  The public comment period for the 
initiative to rescind the rule ended at midnight on April 9, 2009, and if 
the administration formally decides to rescind the rule, it will have to 
begin a rule-making process to issue a new rule.112 
Controversy over the regulation stemmed, in part, from a provision 
that enables healthcare workers to abstain from participating in 
abortions that they may define as terminating a human life before or 
                                                                                                             
U.S.C. § 238n(c)(2) (2006).  The Weldon Amendment defines the term as “‘includ[ing] an 
individual physician or other health care professional, a hospital, a provider-sponsored 
organization, a health maintenance organization, a health insurance plan, or any other kind 
of health care facility, organization, or plan.’”  Consolidated Appropriations Act, Pub. L. 
No. 110-161, § 508(d)(2), 121 Stat. 1844, 2209 (2007). 
111 Noam Levey, Obama Dropping Abortion Conscience Rule, THE SWAMP, Feb. 27, 2009, 
http://www.swamppolitics.com/news/politics/blog/2009/02/obama_drops_abortion_c
onscienc.html (last visited Aug. 16, 2009). 
 Obama may sign into law the Freedom of Choice Act (“FOCA”), a piece of legislation 
that would 
invalidate any “statute, ordinance, regulation, administrative order, 
decision, policy, practice, or other action” of any federal, state, or local 
government or governmental official (or any person acting under 
government authority) that would “deny or interfere with a woman’s 
right to choose” abortion, or that would “discriminate against the 
exercise of the right . . . in the regulation or provision of benefits, 
facilities, services, or information.” 
Denise M. Burke, The Freedom of Choice Act:  A Radical Attempt to Prematurely End Debate 
Over Abortion, http://www.aul.org/FOCA (last visited Jan. 4, 2009). 
 Under FOCA, “no healthcare provider will be able to conscientiously object to a 
woman’s request to have an abortion.”  Deborah Sturm, Whose Choice?  Protecting Healthcare 
Providers’ Conscience Rights, http://www.cuf.org/Laywitness/LWonline/jf09sturm.asp 
(last visited Jan. 4, 2009). 
112 Kathleen Gilbert, Last Chance to Ask Obama Administration to Retain Conscience 
Protections for Pro-Life Doctors, LifeSiteNews.com, April 6, 2009, http://www.lifesitenews. 
com/ldn/2009/apr/09040608.html (last visited May 19, 2009); Levey, supra note 111. 
 Dr. Donald Thompson of the Christian Medical Association argues that “repealing the 
rules would only exacerbate the shortage of doctors the nation is experiencing” and that 
repealing conscience protection “‘could drive thousands of faith-based physicians out of 
medicine and close faith-based hospitals that provide over 17% of the health care delivered 
in the United States.’”  Steven Ertelt, Pro-Life Doctor:  Obama’s Repealing Conscience rules 
would Hurt Health Care, LifeSiteNews.com, May 8, 2009, http://www.lifenews.com/ 
nat5033.html (last visited May 19, 2009).  A poll taken in March, 2009, indicated that 78% of 
participants who support legal abortions favor conscience protections for medical staff and 
centers and that 62% of respondents opposed revocation of the rule enacted under the Bush 
Administration.  Steven Ertelt, Poll:  Americans Want Obama to Keep Abortion Conscience 
Clause in Place, LifeSiteNews.com, April 8, 2009, http://www.lifenews.com/nat4975.html 
(last visited May 19, 2009). 
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after implantation.113  Someone in HHS leaked the proposed regulation 
to the New York Times, claiming that it redefined abortion to include 
contraception.114  Leavitt emphasized that this regulation is not intended 
to redefine or change abortion rights, but is about preventing coercion of 
doctors to engage in practices they find conscientiously objectionable.115  
Leavitt has observed that “[o]ur nation was built on a foundation of free 
speech.  The first principle of free speech is protected conscience.  Th[e] 
proposed rule is a fundamental protection for medical providers to 
follow theirs.”116 
Indeed, because the First Amendment of the federal Constitution 
provides in part that “Congress shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof[,]” it 
may be the ultimate refuge for pharmacists and other healthcare workers 
seeking protection from coercive laws.117  Maxine M. Harrington states 
that “[l]egislative accommodations are reasonable and consistent with 
the Establishment Clause when they have a secular purpose and do not 
serve primarily to advance religion or foster an excessive entanglement 
with religion[,]” and that an incidental benefit to religion or even an 
explicit reference to it does not make the law violative of the 
Establishment Clause.118  Although absolute religious accommodations 
                                                 
113 Wright, supra note 96. 
114 Id. 
115 Posting of Michael O. Leavitt to Physician Conscience Blog II, http://archive.hhs. 
gov/secretarysblog/my_weblog/physician_conscience/index.html (Aug. 11, 2008). 
116 Id.  HHS expressly exempted the conscience regulation from Title VII’s provision that 
an employer must accommodate an employee only to the extent that doing so would not be 
an undue burden.  Kim Worobec & Jennifer Gray, HHS’ New Provider Conscience 
Regulations, 21 NO. 4 HEALTH LAW 35, 36 (2009). 
117 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
118 Harrington, supra note 104, at 828.  See infra notes 179–93 and accompanying text 
(explaining that there is a distinction between laws that alleviate government-imposed 
burdens on religious believers and laws that expand the rights of believers). 
 Matthew White suggests that although there are ways of challenging conscience 
clauses’ constitutionality, they are well-established in state law and thus protections for 
pharmacists are unlikely to be overturned.  Matthew White, Note, Conscience Clauses for 
Pharmacists:  The Struggle to Balance Conscience Rights with the Rights of Patients and 
Institutions, 2005 WIS. L. REV. 1611, 1631–34 (2005).  See infra notes 168, 182 (discussion of 
White’s arguments).  Tom C. W. Lin also believes that pharmacist conscience laws would 
pass a religious establishment test.  Tom C. W. Lin, Treating an Unhealthy Conscience:  A 
Prescription or Medical Conscience Clauses, 31 VT. L. REV. 105, 114 (2006).  See infra note 182 
(brief discussion of Lin’s observation). 
 However, Melissa Duvall has also examined the constitutionality of pharmacist 
conscience laws and suggests that they should fail if they do not contain referral or 
emergency provisions.  Melissa Duvall, Note, Pharmacy Conscience Clause Statutes:  
Constitutional Religious “Accommodations” or Unconstitutional “Substantial Burdens” on 
Women? 55 AM. U. L. REV. 1485, 1506, 1517–18 (2006).  See infra note 185 (further discussing 
Duvall’s argument). 
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run afoul of the Establishment Clause, recent health conscience laws are 
probably not unconstitutional because they do not endorse or advance 
religion or religious practices, respectively, despite the fact that some of 
these laws grant health practitioners an absolute right to refuse 
services.119 
The key to effective and successful conscience laws is ensuring that 
they protect secular ethical or moral refusals in addition to religious 
conscientious objections, thereby making the laws more likely to 
withstand a First Amendment challenge.120  If a conscience law implies 
                                                 
119 Harrington, supra note 104, at 829.  Spreng argues that “the protections the United 
States Constitution provides to refusing pharmacists are uncertain at this time.  Therefore, 
statutory conscience protections from legal liability could be crucial to dissenting 
pharmacists’ futures in the profession.”  Spreng, supra note 42, at 354.  Furthermore,  
conscience clauses are underutilized in direct challenges to must-fill 
requirements.  But with good drafting and in light of recent Supreme 
Court Establishment Clause precedent, they could be more productive 
protection than the Free Exercise Clause or, at minimum, provide an 
additional line of attack against a liability suit in an area where federal 
constitutional law is increasingly complicated. 
Id. at 371 (footnotes omitted). 
120 Harrington, supra note 104, at 829–30.  As is discussed at length in Part III, objecting 
pharmacists must be aware of the fact that use of contraceptives is a fundamental right and 
that the free exercise of religion may not necessarily exempt a person from compliance with 
a neutral and generally applicable law.  See infra notes 166–93 and accompanying text 
(discussing constitutional issues related to pharmacist conscience laws); Employment Div., 
Dept. of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990) (holding that religious 
believers may be subject to neutral and generally applicable laws); Griswold v. Conn., 381 
U.S. 479, 484–86, 503–04 (1965) (White, J., concurring) (holding that the right to use 
contraceptives is grounded in a constitutional right to privacy). 
 However, a general constitutional right to healthcare does not exist.  Cf. Cruzan v. 
Dir., Mo. Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 265, 278 (1990) (holding that parents did not have 
authority to withdraw disabled daughter’s artificial feeding and hydration equipment 
because there was no clear and convincing evidence of daughter’s desire to have life-
sustaining treatment withdrawn).  States can, pursuant to the Tenth Amendment, enact 
conscience laws consistent with their police powers to ensure the health, safety, and 
welfare of their citizens.  See Brian P. Knestout, Note, An Essential Prescription:  Why 
Pharmacist-Inclusive Conscience Clauses are Necessary, 22 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 349, 
351 (2006); infra notes 150–59 and accompanying text (discussing fact that health care is not 
a right and inconvenience may not be adequate basis for demanding dispensing of 
medicines).  
 Furthermore, an incidental burden on a constitutional right is different from a 
substantial burden on that right. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 
874 (1992) (distinguishing between substantial and incidental burdens).  The federal 
government can, consistent with the Establishment Clause, relieve an entity from a burden 
on its religious expression imposed by the government itself.  See Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 
U.S. 709, 720 (2005) (holding that the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act 
of 2000 is “compatible with the Establishment Clause because it alleviates exceptional 
government-created burdens on private religious exercise[]”); Corp. of the Presiding 
Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 334–35 (1987) 
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that its main thrust is to protect religious beliefs, the law may be viewed 
as endorsing religion in spite of any protection it may afford to secular 
beliefs.121  Harrington contends that extending conscience laws to 
include (and perhaps emphasize) non-religious secular and moral 
convictions is wise and constitutional, an observation consistent with the 
Supreme Court’s holding in Welsh v. United States, whereby the Court 
determined that beliefs purely ethical or moral in substance are sufficient 
to merit exemption from military service.122 
In sum, the limited examples of federal medical conscientious 
objector protections discussed above demonstrate that government has 
identified healthcare providers as human beings with moral convictions 
who should not be conscripted into service against their consciences, 
even in spite of their monopoly on healing and their status as the 
exclusive source of society’s often-needed cures and remedies.123 
c. Professional Standards 
Not surprisingly, the American Pharmacists Association (“APhA”) 
has commented on right-of-conscience laws for pharmacists; APhA 
describes its two-part policy, dating back to 1998, as supporting “the 
ability of the pharmacist to step away from participating in activity to 
which they have personal objections—but not step in the way.”124  While 
APhA condones a pharmacist’s refusal to dispense a drug on moral or 
ethical grounds, it strives to ensure that patients’ needs are met.125  Thus, 
                                                                                                             
(holding that the Establishment Clause permits religious exercise without sponsorship or 
interference by the government so long as the accommodation does not morph into 
fostering of religion); Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703, 710 (1985) (holding 
that a law that has “a primary effect that impermissibly advances a particular religious 
practice” is unconstitutional because “the statute goes beyond having an incidental or 
remote effect of advancing religion[]”); infra notes 179–93 and accompanying text 
(distinguishing the granting of greater free exercise rights from alleviating a government-
imposed burden on religious believers). 
121 Harrington, supra note 104, at 830. 
122 398 U.S. at 340 (emphasis added). 
123 See supra notes 92–120 and accompanying text (describing conscience protection at the 
federal level).  International consensus has begun to recognize conscientious objection as a 
human right.  See Emily N. Marcus, Conscientious Objection as an Emerging Human Right, 38 
VA. J. INT’L L. 507, 514–15 (1998) (stating that the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights recognizes a right to conscience). 
124 American Pharmacist Association, AMA Rules on Pharmacist Conscience Clauses, 
http://www.pharmacist.com/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Search1&template=/CM/HTM
LDisplay.cfm&ContentID=8688 (last visited Aug. 16, 2009). 
125 Id.  Pharmacists are also guided by a code of ethics and an oath that both compel the 
pharmacist to promote the welfare of the patient.  American Pharmacists Association, Code 
of Ethics for Pharmacists, http://www.pharmacist.com/AM/Template.cfm?Section= 
Search1&template=/CM/HTMLDisplay.cfm&ContentID=2903 (last visited Aug. 16, 2009); 
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APhA agrees with the American Medical Association (“AMA”) that 
professional service to patients is essential, a concept articulated by an 
AMA resolution providing, in part, that if a pharmacist conscientiously 
objects to dispensing a drug, he or she will refer the patient to a 
dispensing pharmacy.126 
In 2005, Susan C. Winckler, APhA Staff Counsel and Vice President 
for Policy and Communications, stated that APhA believed that no 
pharmacist should have to participate in things he or she finds morally 
objectionable, but that policies should be implemented whereby the 
needs of both the pharmacist and patient can be met, meaning that 
transferring a prescription or referring it to a partner might be necessary; 
ultimately, Winckler asserts that “‘[c]onflict between the pharmacist and 
the patient is never acceptable.’”127 
                                                                                                             
American Pharmacists Association, The Oath of a Pharmacist, http://www.pharmacist. 
com/Content/NavigationMenu2/LeadershipProfessionalism/ProfessionalDevelopment/
OathofaPharmacist/default.htm (last visited Aug. 16, 2009).  However, a duty to dispense 
medications does not exist (see infra notes 194–201 and accompanying text (discussing 
same)).  Spreng, Harrington, and Maria Teresa Weidner have noted that a professional 
relationship between a pharmacist and patient could give rise to a duty to dispense if the 
patient has come to rely on that pharmacist for his or her medicines and does not have 
notice of that pharmacist’s moral objections.  See infra notes 194–201 and accompanying text 
(discussing same); Maria Teresa Weidner, Note, Striking a Balance Between Faith and Freedom:  
Military Conscientious Objection as a Model for Pharmacist Refusal, 11 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 
369, 376–77 (2008).  Thus, pharmacists have fiduciary duties, including a duty to provide 
informed consent that requires pharmacists to inform patients about their moral objections.  
See infra note 194 and accompanying text (discussing pharmacist duties); cf. William L. 
Allen and David B. Brushwood, Pharmaceutically Assisted Death and the Pharmacist’s Right of 
Conscience, 5 J. PHARMACY & L. 1, 14 (1996) (arguing that “transactions between 
pharmacists and consumers are circumscribed by fiduciary duty.”). 
126 American Pharmacist Association, supra note 124. 
127 Ed Lamb, Dispensing with the Dilemma, PHARMACY TODAY (Aug. 2005), available at 
http://www.pharmacist.com (search “Dispensing with the Dilemma”; then click on the 
first result returned) (last visited Aug. 16, 2009).  As is discussed at length in Part III.A, 
proponents of must-fill laws commonly argue that because of pharmacists’ unique 
monopoly on distribution of prescription drugs, pharmacists should not hinder patient 
access to those drugs, especially when a woman has limited means or is living in a rural 
community with limited access to pharmacists.  See National Rural Health Association, 
Issue Paper:  Recruitment and Retention of a Quality Health Workforce in Rural Areas, (May 
2005), available at http://www.ruralhealthweb.org/index.cfm?objectid=4075DEAB-1185-
6B66-88E95A371EF681D6 (last visited Aug. 16, 2009) (discussing limited number of 
pharmacies in rural communities); see, e.g., Nelson, supra note 32, at 157; Spreng, supra note 
29, at 229; Holly Teliska, Note, Obstacles to Access:  How Pharmacist Refusal Clauses 
Undermine the Basic Health Care Needs of Rural and Low-Income Women, 20 BERKELEY J. 
GENDER L. & JUST. 229, 247 (2005) (all addressing perceived plight of women in rural areas 
with limited access to pharmacies); infra notes 137–49 and accompanying text (discussing 
opposition to conscience laws). 
 However, the common law has never recognized a duty to dispense medication.  See 
infra notes 194–201 and accompanying text (discussing same).  By analogy, an incidental 
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However, granting a pharmacist a right of conscience, but expecting 
him or her to refer a patient or transfer a prescription may not be much 
of a concession from the perspective of pharmacists who are no more 
willing to refer a patient than to fill her prescription.128  Respect for the 
“autonomy and dignity of each patient” is a part of the Code of Ethics 
for Pharmacists, listed third after the required promotion of “the good of 
every patient in a caring, compassionate, and confidential manner.”129  
Likewise, the pharmacist’s oath requires consideration of “the welfare of 
humanity and relief of human suffering [as] primary concerns,” and 
maintenance of the “highest principles of [the] profession’s moral, ethical 
and legal conduct.”130 
In 1995, APhA’s Pharmaceutical Care Guidelines Advisory 
Committee issued “Principles of Practice for Pharmaceutical Care[,]” a 
collection of guiding principles intended to facilitate the profession’s 
goal of optimizing the patient’s health-related quality of life, among 
other objectives.131  Conscientious pharmacists may find some of the 
                                                                                                             
lack of abortion providers in a particular community has never been considered a violation 
of the right of a woman to have an abortion.  See Yoder, supra note 74, at 1016 (discussing 
same); infra text accompanying notes 150–59 (discussing same).  Spreng has also 
acknowledged this parallel, noting that “[o]nly state statutes substantially limiting access to 
contraception” are a problem and that there is a difference between a substantial and 
incidental government burden on rights.  Spreng, supra note 42, at 400–01 (discussing 
same); infra text accompanying notes 160–65 (discussing same). 
 Not everyone believes that pharmacists should be able to object to dispensing legally 
prescribed medications.  See, e.g., Minh N. Nguyen, Note, Refusal Clauses & Pro-Life 
Pharmacists:  How Can We Protect Ourselves from Them? 8 SCHOLAR 251, 253 (2006); NARAL 
Pro-Choice America, Guarantee Women’s Access to Prescriptions 5 (Dec. 1, 2007), available at 
http://www.prochoiceamerica.org/assets/files/Birth-Control-Pharmacy-Access.pdf; 
Elizabeth Rose, The Tip of the Spear:  Defending Pharmacists’ Rights of Conscience, 
http://www.aul.org/Tip_of_the_Spear (last visited Jan. 4, 2009); Rebecca Wind, Health 
Care Providers Cross the Line when They Obstruct Women’s Access to Legal Medication, 
http://www.guttmacher.org/media/nr/2005/08/02/index.html (last visited Jan. 5, 2009) 
(all discussing opposition to the implications of conscience laws). 
128 Nelson, supra note 32, at 166.  In establishing a standard of care for objecting 
pharmacists, courts may apply APhA’s professional expectation that pharmacists somehow 
ensure patients’ access to their requested medications.  Heather A. Weisser, Note, 
Abolishing the Pharmacist’s Veto:  An Argument in Support of a Wrongful Conception Cause of 
Action Against Pharmacists Who Refuse to Provide Emergency Contraception, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 
865, 895–96, 897–902 (2007). 
129 American Pharmacists Association, Code of Ethics for Pharmacists, 
http://www.pharmacist.com/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Search1&template=/CM/HTM
LDisplay.cfm&ContentID=2903 (last visited Sept. 29, 2008). 
130 American Pharmacists Association, The Oath of a Pharmacist, 
http://www.pharmacist.com/Content/NavigationMenu2/LeadershipProfessionalism/Pr
ofessionalDevelopment/OathofaPharmacist/default.htm (last visited Sept. 29, 2008). 
131 American Pharmacist Association, Principles of Practice for Pharmaceutical Care, 
http://www.pharmacist.com/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Practice_Resources&TEMPLAT
E=/CM/HTMLDisplay.cfm&CONTENTID=2906 (last visited Aug. 16, 2009). 
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provisions in these principles helpful and others harmful; for instance, 
“[i]nteraction between the pharmacist and the patient must occur to 
assure that a relationship based upon caring, trust, open communication, 
cooperation, and mutual decision making is established and 
maintained[,]” and “[t]he pharmacist develops mechanisms to assure the 
patient has access to pharmaceutical care at all times.”132  However, the 
patient is to be apprised of the pros and cons of prescribed medical 
treatment, including opportunities to improve its safety, and “instances 
where one option may be more beneficial based on the pharmacist’s 
professional judgment.”133 
III.  ANALYSIS 
Against the backdrop of the historical and contemporary significance 
of conscience protection, this Part of the Note first examines arguments 
against pharmacist conscience laws and then explores whether patients’ 
inconvenience justifies requiring pharmacists to dispense medications to 
which they object.134  Next, this Part addresses the distinctions between 
substantial and incidental burdens on constitutional rights, the extent of 
free exercise rights after the Smith decision, and the differences between 
alleviating a government-imposed burden on free exercise rights and 
extending the rights of religious believers.135  Finally, this Part discusses 
the fact that a duty to dispense has never been a part of the common 
law.136 
A. Opposition to Pharmacist Conscience Laws 
Not everyone is unified in the belief that pharmacists deserve right-
of-conscience protection.137  The principal objections that opponents of 
conscience laws present are interrelated; opponents claim that 
pharmacists have a duty to dispense medications and patients have a 
right to obtain these medications as part of a health plan they and their 
                                                 
132 Id. at A.  The pharmacist is also supposed to “assume ultimate responsibility for 
assuring that his/her patient has been able to obtain, and is appropriately using, any drugs 
and related products or equipment called for in the drug therapy plan.”  Id. at D. 
133 Id. at C, E (2). 
134 See infra Part III.A–B (discussing same).  Part III intentionally relies heavily on the 
research of Jennifer E. Spreng as Professor Spreng has extensively researched the 
constitutional implications of conscience laws and has made unique and compelling 
observations and arguments. 
135 See infra Part III.C–E (discussing same). 
136 See infra Part III.F (discussing same). 
137 See supra note 127 (referencing several commentators who have expressed skepticism 
or opposition to pharmacist conscience laws). 
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doctors have designed.138  Conscience law critic Holly Teliska has stated 
that “[a] patient should never be expected to shoulder the burden of a 
pharmacist’s personal religious philosophy” and that any conscience 
provision “should be limited by thoughtful consideration of patients’ 
                                                 
138 Nelson suggests that there are four main arguments directed against conscience laws: 
[t[he opponents of conscience protection for pharmacists pose four 
main arguments for why pharmacists should be forced to dispense all 
legal prescriptions.  First, they argue that a patient’s autonomy should 
trump a pharmacist’s right to conscience.  A second argument is that a 
pharmacist should not be allowed to impose his or her views on the 
patient.  Third, opponents argue that conscience clauses have potential 
for abuse.  Finally, advocates against conscience protection argue that 
pharmacists will block access to certain drugs. 
Nelson, supra note 32, at 160 (footnotes omitted). 
 In response to these arguments, Nelson contends, respectively, that “allowing a 
patient to order the pharmacist to fill a prescription severely infringes upon the 
pharmacist’s own right to autonomy[,]” and that “unfettered” patient autonomy can lead 
to “disastrous effects[;] . . . [f]orcing a pharmacist to provide a medication that the 
pharmacist believes will lead to the death of a person is imposing the patient’s views onto 
the pharmacist, not the other way around[;] . . . conscientious objection can be limited 
through the wording of the legislation”to avoid discrimination problems, and “just because 
conscience clauses have potential for abuse is no reason to ban conscience clauses all 
together[;]” and finally, the argument that objecting pharmacists will block access to 
needed drugs is “flawed” because it “presupposes that abortifacients and lethal drugs are 
‘needs’ of the patient[,]” patients may be wrong about what they truly need, and 
conscience clauses will still accommodate access to contraceptives, they will just prohibit 
someone from being required to dispense them.  Id. at 161–65. 
 NARAL Pro-Choice America has argued that: 
[w]hen a woman and her doctor have made the decision that a 
prescription for birth control is in her best interest, a third party has no 
right to override that decision.  Pharmacies have a duty to dispense 
and have an ethical obligation not to endanger their patients’ health by 
withholding basic health care. 
NARAL Pro-Choice America, supra note 127, at 5. 
 Conscience law opponent Minh N. Nguyen argues that “[e]very patient is entitled to 
have his or her prescriptions filled for medications that licensed physicians and healthcare 
providers have prescribed[,]” and that “under no circumstances should [pharmacists’] 
beliefs infringe upon the rights of others.”  Nguyen, supra note 127, at 253, 271. 
 However, another commentator has explained that: 
[o]pponents of freedom of conscience contend that a pharmacist’s right 
to conscientious objection must be subordinated to the needs of 
patients; however, conscientious objection does not prevent patients 
from obtaining contraceptives from other sources.  Just as the exercise 
of freedom of speech does not force others to agree with the speaker, 
the exercise of freedom of conscience does not force others to agree 
with an objector.  Objectors act primarily to preserve their own moral 
integrity, not to block access to services or to punish or control 
patients. 
Rose, supra note 127. 
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medical needs.”139  Yet, as Jessica D. Yoder has stated, “pharmacists 
should be able to incorporate moral decisions into the operation of their 
businesses because they are not discriminating against the patient; they 
are simply choosing not to be involved with the patient’s decisions and 
exercising their business judgment.”140 
Teliska argues that a refusal should be permitted only if alternative 
access to the medication is available because a woman should neither 
have to travel in search of dispensing pharmacists nor wait an 
unreasonable length of time for her prescription, and an objecting 
pharmacist should be required at least to refer a patient seeking a 
contraceptive.141  Nonetheless, an incidental burden on the constitutional 
right to access contraceptives may very well be permissible, meaning 
that inconvenience in obtaining contraceptives might not be adequate 
grounds for a constitutional claim against conscientious pharmacists.142 
Finally, Teliska emphasizes that to save patients an unnecessary trip 
to a particular pharmacy, an objecting pharmacist there should be 
required to post his or her work schedule along with a notice describing 
his or her opposition to interfacing with specific prescriptions.143  Indeed, 
this measure may be necessary in order for objecting pharmacists to 
accommodate hostile laws or judicial opinions.144 
To illustrate why they believe must-fill laws are necessary, 
proponents of such laws often present a certain hypothetical situation 
that usually depicts a woman in a rural or remote setting going to the 
nearest pharmacy to obtain either a refill of her birth control pills or to 
have a new prescription filled.145  Perhaps she urgently needs the new 
pills as she has only one pill left and missing the next dosage would 
                                                 
139 Teliska, supra note 127, at 247. 
140 Yoder, supra note 74, at 1015. 
141 Teliska, supra note 127, at 231, 247. 
142 See infra text accompanying notes 160–65 (explaining the difference between an 
incidental and a substantial burden on constitutional rights). 
143 Teliska, supra note 127, at 247. 
144 Cf. infra text accompanying note 214 (explaining that some jurisdictions already 
require notice). 
145 See, e.g., Teliska, supra note 127, at 231 (discussing rural hypothetical).  The National 
Rural Health Association states that: 
rural America gets fewer pharmacists than what might be considered 
its fair share.  According to a study by the American Pharmacists 
Association, 20 percent of the nation’s population lives in rural 
America but only 12 percent of its pharmacists practice there.  Like 
other rural health care providers, pharmacists who wish to set up shop 
in the small towns and countryside face the obstacles that come from 
remoteness, isolation, and a higher percentage of lower income 
clientele. 
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upset her birth control framework.146  Nevertheless, she is shocked to 
learn that the pharmacist on duty refuses to dispense the pills, and there 
is no one else in the employ of the pharmacy who can fill her 
prescription.147  In addition, the next closest pharmacy is thirty miles 
away and the woman cannot, without great hardship, travel to this 
pharmacy for her pills.148  Thus, the argument is made that because 
pharmacists have voluntarily chosen to accept the role of “gatekeepers” 
of medication, they are obligated to simply dispense medications in 
exchange for a valid prescription.149 
B. Inconvenience May Not be Adequate Justification for Compelling 
Conscientious Pharmacists to Dispense 
While access to pharmacists in rural or remote locations may not be 
generous, by analogy, the Supreme Court has never declared that if there 
is only one doctor to serve a rural or remote community that that doctor 
must learn how to perform abortions or sterilizations and provide those 
services to local patients.150  If there is no doctor available to provide 
                                                 
National Rural Health Association, supra note 127. 
 Yoder has noted that “[p]harmacists in small rural towns have found that demand for 
emergency contraception is particularly low because women actually prefer to go out of 
town to have their prescriptions filled in order to better protect their privacy[,]” and that 
“[o]n a nationwide level, refusals also seem to be a statistically minor problem.”  Yoder, 
supra note 74, at n.145.  Furthermore, “‘[n]early 3.3 billion prescriptions are dispensed each 
year in the outpatient setting, . . . averaging about 9 million prescriptions per day.  
Proponents of ‘duty to fill’ laws document approximately twelve examples of refusals to 
fill since 1996[, as of 2005].’”  Id. (quoting Freedom of Conscience for Small Pharmacies:  Hearing 
Before the H. Small Business Comm., 109th Cong. 7 (2005) (statement of Linda Garrelts 
MacLean)). 
146 Cf. Teliska, supra note 127, at 31, 238. 
147 Id. 
148 Id. 
149 See, e.g., Nelson, supra note 32, at 157; Spreng, supra note 29, at 229; Teliska, supra note 
127, at 247.  Spreng writes that there is currently a shift occurring within the 
pharmaceutical community whereby pharmacists are no longer acting as automated 
dispensers of medications but instead as providers of “pharmaceutical care,. . .  [taking] a 
lead role in planning and administering patients’ drug therapy as well as substantial 
responsibility for the results.”  Spreng, supra note 29, at 228–32.  Weidner explains that 
recent cases have recognized “‘expanded dut[ies]’” for pharmacists who are now expected 
not just to avoid harm to patients, but to promote their welfare.  Weidner, supra note 125, at 
376–77 (alteration in original). 
150 Yoder explains that: 
[t]he Supreme Court has made clear through its abortion funding 
cases, such as Beal v. Doe and Maher v. Roe, that the government is only 
required to avoid unduly burdening the right to an abortion; it is not 
required to take affirmative steps to make abortions available or easier 
to access.  Although the scope of the right to contraception is broader, 
there is no indication that this right creates any duties either; in 
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these services in that community, its residents will have to travel—
perhaps hundreds of miles—to the nearest doctor who can provide the 
services, and while such travel may be inconvenient, such an incidental 
burden has never been viewed as an unconstitutional burden on the 
right to abortion, so long as local or state laws are not the cause of this 
predicament.151  Thus, a woman confronted with an objecting pharmacist 
and a lack of easy access to alternative sources of medication may face 
inconvenience in obtaining her pills.152 
Just as inconvenience in obtaining an abortion has not been 
considered sufficient cause to coerce doctors to provide such service, 
mere inconvenience in obtaining contraceptives may not be adequate 
justification for compelling a pharmacist to dispense such medication in 
violation of his or her conscience.153  In other words,  
[t]here is no reason to think a woman has a right to have 
access to a particular type of contraception or even to 
any contraception in any particular moment if all a 
regulation limiting access does is make her decision 
about whether to bear a child ‘more difficult or more 
expensive.’”154   
                                                                                                             
general, the Court has not required the government to subsidize the 
exercise of constitutional rights. 
Yoder, supra note 74, at 1004 (footnotes omitted).  
 Thus, one could argue that the government is not obligated to facilitate access to 
contraceptives.  Cf. id.  Although the government cannot hinder access to contraceptives, the 
possibility that the objection of some pharmacists might make access more inconvenient to 
others is not the same as government denial of the right to use contraceptives.  See infra text 
accompanying notes 160–65 (discussing same). 
151 Cf. infra text accompanying notes 152–65 (discussing same). 
152 It is quite possible that another pharmacist on duty might be able to fill the 
prescription or that one of the technicians on duty could fill the prescription while being 
supervised via a webcam or similar technology, something that is required by Illinois law if 
a non-objecting pharmacist is not available at a pharmacy.  See 68 IL ADC 1330.91(j)(3)(B) 
(2008) (allowing webcam technology to be used if a non-objecting pharmacist is not on 
staff).  Additionally, contraceptives are typically available online, at hospitals, and at 
medical clinics.  Nelson, supra note 32, at 165.  Yoder proposes that perhaps willing 
physicians could dispense emergency contraception themselves.  Yoder, supra note 74, at 
1013.  Furthermore, there is a hotline and website that provide information about where 
women can obtain emergency contraceptives:  1-888-not-2-late and http://not–2–late.com, 
respectively.  Id. at 1014. 
153 Cf. supra notes 150–52 and accompanying text (discussing Supreme Court abortion 
jurisprudence); cf. infra text accompanying notes 154–65 (discussing Supreme Court 
abortion jurisprudence and distinctions between substantial and incidental burdens on 
constitutional rights). 
154 Spreng, supra note 42, at 401. 
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Because the Supreme Court has held that the use of contraceptives is a 
fundamental right, ordinarily a state law that potentially burdens this 
right would have to pass strict scrutiny.155  However, conscience laws do 
not suspend the right to use contraceptives by a woman (who still has 
the right even if she has been inconvenienced by an objecting 
pharmacist), and regardless, the Tenth Amendment permits states to use 
their police power to preserve the welfare (in this case, the freedom of 
conscience) of their people.156 
From a constitutional perspective, “access to health care in the 
United States is not generally a ‘right.’”157  The Supreme Court has never 
held that the Constitution affords a fundamental right to healthcare or 
medication.158  At most, patients have a constitutional right to refuse 
unwanted medical treatment.159 
C. There are Distinctions Between Substantial and Incidental Burdens on 
Constitutional Rights 
There is a difference between a substantial and an incidental 
government burden on “the right to decide whether to bear a child.”160  
Only state statutes that substantially limit access to contraception violate 
a woman’s “fundamental right ‘to be free from unwarranted 
governmental intrusion into . . . the decision whether to bear or beget a 
child’ because such statutes substantially limit her access to the means of 
                                                 
155 See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484–86, 503–04 (1965) (White, J., concurring) 
(holding that the right to use contraceptives is grounded in a constitutional right to 
privacy). 
156 Brian P. Knestout argues that: 
[s]ince the regulation of the pharmaceutical and medical professions is 
reserved to the states by the 10th Amendment, conscience clauses are 
constitutionally permissible.  Common law police power doctrine 
recognizes that states have the power to enact laws for the 
preservation of the health, safety, and welfare of the people, provided 
that those laws do not conflict with superseding federal, or 
constitutional, law.  Neither the 14th Amendment’s protections of 
access to birth control and abortion, nor any individual’s First 
Amendment right to free exercise of religion, compel or forbid the 
existence of such liability-shielding statutes. 
Knestout, supra note 120, at 351. 
157 Harrington, supra note 104, at 801. 
158 Id. at 802. 
159 See Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 265, 278 (1990) (holding that 
parents did not have authority to withdraw their disabled daughter’s artificial feeding and 
hydration equipment because there was no clear and convincing evidence of the daughter’s 
desire to have life-sustaining treatment withdrawn). 
160 Spreng, supra note 42, at 400. 
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effectuating that decision, whether through contraception or abortion.”161  
The Court in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey162 
articulated that: 
[t]he fact that a law which serves a valid purpose, one 
not designed to strike at the right itself, has the 
incidental effect of making it more difficult or more 
expensive to procure an abortion cannot be enough to 
invalidate it.  Only where state regulation imposes an 
undue burden on a woman’s ability to make this 
decision does the power of the State reach into the heart 
of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause.163 
Hence, any incidental burden on a woman’s ability to access 
contraceptives because of legal protection for pharmacists’ consciences 
stems not from a legislative attempt to violate the rights of women, but 
results from an effort simply to protect pharmacists’ religious liberties.164  
In addition, if any burden exists, “it emanates from the pharmacist 
herself, not the state.  Thus, a customer’s Fourteenth Amendment 
substantive due process rights do not protect her anyway because a 
pharmacist does not qualify as a ‘state actor.’”165 
D. Free Exercise After the Smith Decision 
Perhaps the biggest potential challenge to pharmacists seeking 
conscience protection is the Supreme Court’s decision in Employment 
Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith,166 a case in 
which the Court reaffirmed the principle that “the right of free exercise 
does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a ‘valid 
and neutral law of general applicability on the ground that the law 
proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or 
proscribes).’”167  Thus, a must-fill law, if worded broadly enough and 
                                                 
161 Id. (quoting Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (holding that a ban on the 
distribution of contraceptives to unmarried individuals is unconstitutional) (footnotes 
omitted)). 
162 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
163 Id. at 874. 
164 Spreng, supra note 42, at 400–01. 
165 Id. at 401. 
166 494 U.S. 872, 888–90 (1990). 
167 Id. at 879 (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 (1982) (Stevens, J., 
concurring)). 
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without evidence of an anti-free exercise purpose, could be upheld in 
spite of its incidental burden on religious expression.168 
However, Menges v. Blagojevich implied, a must-fill law passed in 
response to expressions of conscientious objection by pharmacists could 
present a First Amendment problem.169  The Smith Court explained that 
neutral and generally applicable laws may violate the First Amendment 
if the religiously motivated action also involved another constitutional 
protection, such as freedom of speech.170  Thus, objecting pharmacists 
could challenge must-fill laws on the grounds that they are not truly 
neutral or that such laws present burdens on both the free exercise of 
pharmacists and their free speech rights.171  The Court stated that to 
excuse a person from abiding by a valid law because of his religious 
beliefs would “permit every citizen to become a law unto himself.”172  
Consequently, conscience laws should be tailored to discourage arbitrary 
and sudden religious objections or objections not grounded in deeply-
held moral convictions.173 
After the Court affirmed “that the Free Exercise Clause still bars 
states from targeting or persecuting religious believers after Smith” in 
                                                 
168 Cf. id; supra text accompanying note 163 (quoting the Casey Court’s holding that an 
incidental burden on access to abortion is not necessarily enough to invalidate a law). 
 Matthew White argues that narrow conscience clauses, those that “only protect health 
care providers who wish to refuse to provide a specific health care service or services 
specifically enumerated in the statute[,]” fail under the Establishment Clause.  White, supra 
note 118, at 1631–32 (2005).  White suggests that narrow conscience clauses “fail their 
essential purpose” because they “do not protect the conscience of all religious adherents 
from the consequences of conscientiously objecting to job duties[,]” only those objecting to 
abortion, sterilization, euthanasia, or contraception.  Id. at 1631.  This could be a potential 
problem for objecting pharmacists, but states have had for many years constitutional laws 
exclusively protecting the consciences of doctors and nurses, a fact even White 
acknowledges.  Id. at 1634; see supra notes 86–88 and accompanying text (discussing the 
Supreme Court’s approval of conscience-protecting laws).  Furthermore, if a conscience law 
serves to alleviate a government-imposed duty to dispense, this may very well be 
permissible.  See infra note 182 and accompanying text (explaining the difference between 
government extending the rights of religious believers and simply relieving a government-
imposed burden on those believers). 
169 451 F. Supp. 2d 992, 997 (C.D. Ill. 2006).  Although the Supreme Court has also said 
that “governmental actions that substantially burden a religious practice must be justified 
by a compelling governmental interest[,]” this standard (called the Sherbert Test—arising 
from Sherbert v. Verner) has never been applied outside unemployment compensation 
cases.  Smith, 494 U.S. at 884.  See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963) (discussing the 
need for a compelling state interest). 
170 Smith, 494 U.S. at 881. 
171 Cf. Spreng, supra note 42, at 367. 
172 Smith, 494 U.S. at 879. 
173 One way this can be done is by limiting a conscience law to specific medications.  See 
infra Part IV.C (discussing same). 
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Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah,174 a pharmacist 
likely must now “show that a duty burdening her religious liberties 
resulted from religious bigotry to qualify for constitutional 
protection.”175  Justice Anthony Kennedy’s concurrence in City of Hialeah 
put forward a purposeful discrimination theory that makes the 
subjective motives of lawmakers a significant component in determining 
the constitutionality of a law.176  Thus, a pharmacist may have to show 
that a law is unconstitutional not merely because it targets religious 
believers, thereby violating the Free Exercise Clause, but because it 
discriminates against religious believers in violation of equal protection 
rights.177  The comments made by Governor Blagojevich are a good 
example of a lawmaker’s subjective intent to discriminate against 
religious believers.178 
E. The Distinctions Between Alleviating a Government-Imposed Burden on 
Free Exercise and Simply Extending Free Exercise Rights 
The fact that pharmacist conscience laws may only alleviate a 
government-imposed burden on religious expression as opposed to 
extending free exercise rights might bolster the constitutionality of these 
laws.179  In striking a Connecticut law that prohibited employers from 
firing workers who refused to work on whatever day of the week they 
claimed as their Sabbath, the Supreme Court reasoned that a law that has 
“a primary effect that impermissibly advances a particular religious 
practice” is unconstitutional because “the statute goes beyond having an 
incidental or remote effect of advancing religion.”180  Additionally, third 
parties (the co-workers of the worshipping employees) were burdened 
by the law which, in its entirety, implicated state action.181 
On the other hand, the Court has held that “[t]here is ample room 
under the Establishment Clause for ‘benevolent neutrality which will 
permit religious exercise to exist without sponsorship and without 
interference[,]’” so long as the accommodation does not devolve into “an 
unlawful fostering of religion.”182  The Court articulated this principle of 
                                                 
174 508 U.S. 520 (1993). 
175 Spreng, supra note 42, at 368–69. 
176 Id. at 369. 
177 Id. at 369–71. 
178 Id. at 370. 
179 Id. at 385–86. 
180 Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703, 710 (1985). 
181 Spreng, supra note 42, at 388. 
182 Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. 
Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 334–35 (1987) (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970); 
Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm’n of Fla., 480 U.S. 136, 145 (1987)).  Lin explains 
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law in Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of 
Latter-day Saints v. Amos,183 a case in which a Mormon church dismissed 
an employee on religious grounds, something the Court held was 
permissible because a provision in the Civil Rights Act of 1964 exempted 
religious employers from anti-discrimination laws, and this exemption 
neither extended a government benefit on the church nor was it 
government advancing religion.184  Thus, state action that bestows rights 
on a set of religious believers and burdens third parties without 
alleviating a government-imposed burden is constitutionally 
problematic compared to laws that simply relieve an entity from a 
government-imposed burden in the form of a facially neutral and 
generally applicable law.185 
                                                                                                             
that in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 411 U.S. 192 (1973), the Supreme Court developed a three-
prong test for determining whether a law violates the Establishment Clause:  the statute 
must have a secular purpose; it must neither advance nor inhibit religion; and it must not 
create an excessive government entanglement with religion.  Lin, supra note 118, at 113.  
White argues that a narrow conscience law could fail the second prong of the test because 
such a law “protects the religious conscience of a pharmacist only if that pharmacist 
happens to possess a set of legislatively approved religious beliefs[,]” thereby advancing a 
particular religious view.  White, supra note 118, at 1633.  However, Lin suggests that 
because these conscience laws do not favor or disfavor religion, they generally comply with 
the Lemon Test.  Lin, supra note 118, at 114. 
 White asserts that narrow conscience laws could also be challenged under the 
endorsement test or the coercion test, two other means (in addition to the Lemon Test) by 
which a violation of the Establishment Clause can be identified.  White, supra note 118, at 
1632, 1633–34.  The endorsement test asks whether a “reasonable objective observer would 
perceive a state endorsement of a religion or religious practice in the challenged state 
action[,]” and because a conscience law only protects certain religious objections, White 
argues, a reasonable observer might perceive government endorsement of those particular 
religious views.  Id. at 1633.  A narrow conscience law could fail the coercion test because 
such a law “has the potential to compel an unwilling person to adhere to a sectarian 
religious belief by restricting availability of contraception, particularly in a locale where 
travel to another pharmacy is impractical.”  Id. at 1633–34.  To be successful under the 
coercion test, a person challenging the conscience law must demonstrate that the 
pharmacist’s objection is associated with a particular sect and is not merely secular in 
substance.  Id. at 1634. 
 Again, White acknowledges that because narrow conscience clauses “are well 
established in state law in the context of abortion, sterilization, and euthanasia[,] . . . it 
seems unlikely that similar protections for pharmacists would be overturned.”  Id. 
183 483 U.S. 327 (1987). 
184 Spreng, supra note 42, at 387–88. 
185 Id. at 386–89.  Duvall notes that while the Supreme Court has permitted states to 
exempt religious adherents from generally applicable laws burdening their free exercise 
rights, these exemptions are limited.  Duvall, supra note 118, at 1506.  Duvall explains that 
in determining the constitutionality of an accommodation, a court must first ask if the law 
implicates the religion clauses of the First Amendment or if the law has a legitimate secular 
purpose.  Id.  If the law has a secular purpose, meaning that it protects religious and non-
religious citizens alike, then the law probably does not present an accommodation problem 
(unless the law was passed for truly religious purposes) and Establishment Clause analysis 
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Spreng likens pharmacist conscience laws to exemptions from the 
government-imposed burden on free exercise rights resulting from must-
fill laws, meaning that Amos analysis applies.186  She explains that “a tort 
duty to sell emergency contraception would burden a dissenting 
pharmacist’s religious liberty by leaving her open to liability[,]” but a 
“statutory conscience accommodation alleviates that burden” without 
giving pharmacists “additional legal benefit by virtue of being 
religious.”187 
The Court’s distinction between laws that bestow special benefits on 
select religious believers and laws that alleviate government-imposed 
burdens on religious believers was reiterated in Cutter v. Wilkinson,188 a 
case that upheld the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons 
                                                                                                             
stops.  Id. at 1506–07.  Duvall argues that while most pharmacist conscience laws broadly 
cover religious and moral objectors, a court would likely find that the laws have the 
purpose of benefiting religious adherents.  Id. at 1507–08. 
 Duvall explains that if the court determines a conscience law is an accommodation, it 
will first look to see if the law creates a religious inducement, something Duvall says is not 
a problem in the case of pharmacist conscience laws.  Id. at 1508.  Second, the court will ask 
if the law bestows any favored or disfavored statuses on any religions, something else 
Duvall doubts would be a problem with pharmacist conscience laws.  Id.  Finally, the court 
would inquire into whether the law benefits religious believers at the cost of substantially 
burdening non-beneficiaries, a factor that Duvall believes could be a problem if the court 
finds that the law substantially burdens a woman’s reproductive rights.  Id. at 1509. 
 In determining what a substantial burden is, Duvall states that the court would look 
at:  “the nature of the burden imposed on a non-beneficiary, the magnitude of the burden, 
and its disproportionality.”  Id.  Thus, Duvall contends, the nature of the burden imposed 
on a woman by pharmacist conscience laws is not merely economic, but an encumbrance 
on her personal autonomy rights regarding family planning.  Id. at 1511.  Furthermore, 
increased costs, travel, or medical risks stemming from a local pharmacist’s refusal to 
dispense might enhance the magnitude of the burden on a woman seeking contraceptives, 
Id. at 1514–16, and an accommodation might disproportionately burden non-beneficiaries if 
it “dictates that non-beneficiaries must accommodate religious adherents’ interests at the 
expense of their own significant interests, without any exceptions.”  Id. at 1516.  Duvall 
argues that pharmacy conscience laws that do not contain referral or emergency provisions 
without exception unconstitutionally place pharmacists’ religious interests ahead of 
women’s reproductive rights and health interests.  Id. at 1517–18. 
 However, Duvall has suggested that “[j]ust as the [Supreme] Court found that 
RLUIPA [the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000], on its face, 
was merely an accommodation and not an establishment of religion, it likely would 
perceive pharmacy conscience clause statutes in the same light.”  Duvall, supra note 118, at 
1505; see infra text accompanying notes 188–93 (discussing RLUIPA). 
186 Spreng, supra note 42, at 389. 
187 Id.  Spreng continues by stating that “a statutory accommodation hardly advances 
religion by encouraging other pharmacists to adopt beliefs that would discourage them 
from selling emergency contraception; instead, others would probably realize that with 
dissenting pharmacists out of the business, their own profits would rise.”  Id. 
188  544 U.S. 709 (2005). 
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Act of 2000 (“RLUIPA”).189  The Court held that a disputed provision in 
the RLUIPA is “compatible with the Establishment Clause because it 
alleviates exceptional government-created burdens on private religious 
exercise” and further held that the Act’s provisions must “be 
administered neutrally among different faiths” and that “courts must 
take adequate account of the burdens a requested accommodation may 
impose on nonbeneficiaries[.]”190 
There may be difficulty in understanding whether the Court’s 
requirement that lower courts take account of burdens on non-
beneficiaries applies in the context of a pharmacist conscience law 
because the Court does not define what an adequate account is and 
because Cutter, in which the plaintiffs were seeking religious free 
exercise benefits from the state, was not an Amos case.191  Regardless, “in 
an Amos pharmacist-accommodation case, ‘adequate account’ could be 
essentially no account at all because the pharmacist herself, not the 
state’s accommodation statute, burdens third parties such as 
customers.”192  Thus, when a pharmacist exercises his or her rights under 
a conscience law, any burden on a customer or co-worker or any 
advancement of religion stems from the choice of the pharmacist, a 
private actor, not from state action, and “no state-imposed burden on 
third-parties exists to take into ‘adequate account’ under Cutter.”193 
F. A Duty to Dispense has Never been a Part of the Common Law 
In the end, the fact remains that a “duty to dispense” has never been 
a part of the common law (a duty to dispense accurately has), and statutes 
requiring that pharmacists dispense medications are a more recent 
development.194  Some have argued that when a patient develops a 
                                                 
189 Spreng, supra note 42, at 393. 
190 Cutter, 544 U.S. at 709. 
191 Spreng, supra note 42, at 396–97.  The plaintiffs in Cutter were present and former 
inmates seeking the ability to dress and worship according to their non-mainstream 
religious beliefs and have access to literature.  544 U.S. at 712–13. 
192 Spreng, supra note 42, at 398. 
193 Id. at 399–400. 
194 Spreng, supra note 29, at 218, 253–57.  Spreng explains that “[a]s to duties to 
warn, . . . courts have often held that pharmacists had no duty to customers based on the 
learned intermediary doctrine[,]” and that “the prescribing physician, not the pharmacist, 
was the learned intermediary with the duty to warn.  Courts considered the physician-
patient relationship virtually inviolate and did not want pharmacists to interfere in any 
way.”  Spreng, supra note 42, at 343–44 (internal citation omitted).  Spreng further explains 
the duties of a pharmacist: 
[a] pharmacist has no duty to warn the customer or notify the 
physician that the drug is being prescribed in dangerous amounts, that 
the customer is being over medicated, or that the various drugs in their 
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professional relationship with a specific pharmacist on whom the patient 
has come to rely for his or her prescriptions and for sundry medical 
advice, a duty to that patient might arise, and a pharmacist cannot, after 
serving that patient for such a length of time, suddenly refuse to fill that 
patient’s prescription without at least referring the patient to a 
pharmacist who will.195  Pharmacists need to be aware of how the 
development of such relationships can potentially influence a court to 
decide that a duty to dispense has arisen.196  Such relationships are 
                                                                                                             
prescribed quantities could cause adverse reactions to the customer.  It 
is the duty of the prescribing physician to know the characteristics of 
the drug he is prescribing, to know how much of the drug he can give 
his patient, to elicit from the patient what other drugs the patient is 
taking, to properly prescribe various combinations of drugs, to warn 
the patient of any dangers associated with taking the drug, to monitor 
the patient’s dependence on the drug, and to tell the patient when and 
how to take the drug.  Further, it is the duty of the patient to notify the 
physician of the other drugs the patient is taking.  Finally, it is the duty 
of the drug manufacturer to notify the physician of any adverse effects 
or other precautions that must be taken in administering the drug.  
Placing these duties to warn on the pharmacist would only serve to 
compel the pharmacist to second guess every prescription a doctor 
orders in an attempt to escape liability. 
Id. at 344. 
195 Spreng, supra note 29, at 218, 253–57.  Harrington observes that “[a]bsent state or 
federal regulation, . . . a health care professional is free to define the parameters of his or 
her practice and may refuse to provide services to prospective patients[,]” and that 
“[f]acilities, although subject to more regulatory standards, are generally not required to 
provide specific treatments.  Thus, an obstetrician-gynecologist may decline to treat a 
woman who seeks an abortion, a private hospital may refuse to admit patients for elective 
sterilizations, and a pharmacy may refuse to stock contraceptives.”  Harrington, supra note 
104, at 803–04. 
196 Harrington also addresses the concept of the duty to disclose information to patients, 
a duty that “may arise out of the fiducial responsibilities of the physician-patient 
relationship, the duty to provide informed consent, or general negligence standards.”  
Harrington, supra note 104, at 809.  A fiduciary relationship inheres deep trust between 
physician and patient and requires that a physician refrain from “undue influence or 
coercion over patients, abuse of the patient’s trust, breach of confidences, and 
abandonment.”  Id. at 810.  Informed consent has to do with the patient having all pertinent 
medical information—all the risks and benefits—in order to “‘determine for himself the 
direction in which his interests seem to lie.’”  Id. at 811 (quoting Canterbury v. Spence, 464 
F.2d 772, 781 (D.C. Cir. 1972)).  Thus, while a pharmacist may not have to recommend 
services to which he or she objects, there is an expectation he or she will disclose this fact to 
patients and still advise them about healthcare options or refer them to someone who will.  
Id. at 813–14 (quoting Am. Coll. of Physicians, Ethics Manual, Fifth Edition, 142 Ann. 
Intern. Med. 560, 564 (2005)).  Again, that a pharmacist should refer a patient or transfer a 
prescription presents concerns of complicity in immoral acts to objecting pharmacists.  See 
supra text accompanying notes 32–33. 
 Allen and Brushwood write: 
[p]harmacists are directly involved in the provision of an essential 
component of the procedure.  Pharmacists not only have personal 
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becoming more common as the pharmaceutical profession transitions 
from being a group of pill dispensers servicing customers to a community 
of healthcare providers offering medical advice and information to 
patients.197  In fact, “pharmacists in many professional settings [have] 
morphed into drug therapy managers, patient educators, and physicians’ 
treatment partners.”198  Thus, pharmacists’ duties correlate to the 
customers’ expectations arising from their relationship, and the greater 
the expectations, the greater the duty; although the law does not grant 
the patient an entitlement to all desired services.199 
Harrington argues that if a relationship exists, health practitioners 
“owe duties to their patients according to accepted standards of care 
and, in the absence of a conscience clause, cannot simply refuse to treat 
or counsel their patients without exposure to liability for abandonment, 
malpractice suits, or disciplinary action.”200  Thus, a well-written 
conscience law and the act of putting patients on notice of a pharmacist’s 
objections are indispensable to avoiding liability.201 
                                                                                                             
ethical convictions that deserve consideration, they also have the same 
professional ethical duties of non-maleficence and beneficence to 
patients that bind physicians, nurses, and other health professionals.  
Caveat emptor (let the buyer beware) may control in the commercial 
aspects of non-pharmaceutical products sold in “drugstores” and the 
supermarkets or discount stores in which pharmacies are located, but 
in the pharmacy itself transactions between pharmacists and 
consumers are circumscribed by fiduciary duty.  These factors provide 
strong support for pharmacists’ claims to be included in provisions to 
protect conscientious objections. 
Allen and Brushwood, supra note 125, at 14. 
197 Spreng, supra note 29, at 228–32.  APhA states that “[p]harmaceutical care is a process 
of drug therapy management that requires a change in the orientation of traditional 
professional attitudes and re-engineering of the traditional pharmacy environment[,]” and 
that “[t]he implementation of pharmaceutical care is supported by patient-centered 
communication.  Within this communication, the patient plays a key role in the overall 
management of the therapy plan.”  American Pharmacists Association, supra note 131, at 
Appendix. 
198 Spreng, supra note 42, at 347. 
199 Id. at 350–51.  Harrington explains that 
[a]lthough patients’ rights have evolved considerably over the past 
fifty years, the law is not so expansive as to grant an individual the 
privilege to insist that a health care provider deliver all desired 
services.  Barring an agreement between patient and provider or a 
statute mandating access, there is no legal duty to treat.  Thus, 
professionals and facilities are generally free to turn away prospective 
patients or limit the scope of their services without fear of liability. 
Harrington, supra note 104, at 782. 
200 Harrington, supra note 104, at 804 
201 See infra Part IV.A, C (discussing what the contents of pharmacist conscience laws 
should be). 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 44, No. 2 [2010], Art. 5
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol44/iss2/5
2010] Good Medicine 553 
IV.  CONTRIBUTION 
Considering the inconsistency of existing conscience laws and the 
arguments over their appropriateness, pharmacists need guidance in 
balancing their moral beliefs and their professional duties.  This Part of 
the Note first emphasizes the importance of preserving both medical 
ethics and the ability of healthcare providers to exercise their 
consciences, and then offers recommendations to pharmacists on how to 
avoid conflicts with their patients over conscientious objection.202  This 
Part then proposes a model right-of-conscience statute for pharmacists.203 
A. The Importance of Conscience Protection 
The American public must realize that all persons involved in the 
healthcare process—doctors, nurses, physician assistants, pharmacists, 
and patients—are human beings with diverse and frequently divergent 
beliefs about a variety of issues, morality included.  Naturally, there has 
to be some give-and-take as patients and healthcare providers interact; 
while mutual respect is essential, neither party should be compelled to 
act contrary to personal moral convictions.  Society as a whole would 
certainly expect a pharmacist to exercise his or her moral principles 
about the value of human life by alerting a patient if there was reason to 
believe that a prescription contained an error or a prescribed medicine 
would harm the patient.  Yet, some individuals would expect a 
pharmacist to stifle those very same moral principles when it comes to 
dispensing contraceptives.  How can pharmacists be expected to turn 
their principles on and off according to the predilections of customers?  
Pharmacists should not have to suppress their moral convictions if they 
have reason to believe a contraceptive might harm someone, particularly 
nascent human life. 
Opponents of right-of-conscience laws often complain that a 
pharmacist’s refusal to fill a prescription, or at least refer a patient to 
someone who will, is an imposition of that pharmacist’s beliefs on the 
patient.204  On the contrary, a pharmacist’s passive refusal to interface 
with a particular medication or to assist in the patient’s acquisition of the 
medication is not tantamount to the pharmacist forcing the patient to 
think or act as he or she does.  However, forcing a pharmacist to fill an 
objectionable prescription or refer a patient to someone who will results 
in a direct imposition of the patient’s desires on the pharmacist, 
                                                 
202 See infra Part IV.A–B (discussing same). 
203 See infra Part IV.C (proposing model statute). 
204 See, e.g., Harrington, supra note 104, at 814; Nelson, supra note 32, at 162 (both 
discussing same). 
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requiring an affirmative act on his or her part in furtherance of that 
patient’s wishes.205  Imposing beliefs on others is a two-way street; 
pharmacists should not harass or slander patients or obstruct their access 
to medication, but patients should not walk into a pharmacy thinking 
that they are entitled to medication.206  The idea that “the customer is 
always right” does not really hold water.207  A customer (patient) can just 
as easily proselytize as the proprietor (pharmacist) can. 
One could argue that must-fill laws and the mentality that supports 
them have the ultimate goal or effect of transforming the pharmaceutical 
industry by pressuring pharmacists with the threat of job loss to change 
or suspend their attitudes or spiritual or mental dispositions toward 
contraceptives or other medications to which they object.  Through laws 
or a change in cultural thinking, medical science can be turned into 
                                                 
205 See Spreng, supra note 29, at 241–43 (discussing same).  Nelson states that, “[f]orcing a 
pharmacist to provide a medication that the pharmacist believes will lead to the death of a 
person is imposing the patient’s views onto the pharmacist, not the other way around.”  
Nelson, supra note 32, at 162. 
206 Patients are certainly free, pursuant to their free speech rights, to request that their 
pharmacists stock and dispense certain medications.  The market will undoubtedly 
respond to this consumer demand, perhaps by providing another pharmacy to service this 
customer base.  One commentator has suggested that 
[i]n medicine where two people are involved, autonomy is always a 
two-way street.  Yes, the patient or “client” has his or her autonomy; 
but so, too, does the practitioner.  There is no good reason (except 
perhaps one grounded in an anti-religious bias) to advocate that a 
patient’s autonomy should trump the autonomy of the professional 
health-care worker just because the two views conflict. 
Nelson, supra note 32, at 161 (quoting Iain T. Benson, “Autonomy,” “Justice” and the Legal 
Requirement to Accommodate the Conscience and Religious Beliefs of Professionals in Health Care, 
http://www.consciencelaws.org/Examining-Conscience-Legal/Legal04.html (updated 
March, 2001)). 
 A passive refusal to dispense a contraceptive or to refer a patient or transfer her 
prescription is not the same as obstructing her access to contraceptives.  Obstruction 
connotes an active effort to thwart access or to completely block all means of access, 
perhaps by withholding or destroying a doctor’s prescription.  See Spreng, supra note 42, at 
351–52 (distinguishing passive refusal from civil disobedience). 
207 Nelson quotes Susan Martinuk who quipped that, “[t]he ‘customer is always right’ 
philosophy may be the best guiding principle for McDonald’s, but it is an inappropriate 
standard for medical ethics.”  Nelson, supra note 32, at 161–62.  Nelson suggests that: 
[o]ur culture equates autonomy with freedom from a given thing:  
“freedom from constraint, from rules, from direction, from guidance, 
from immutable principles.”  With this understanding of freedom, 
patient autonomy becomes the patient’s right to do anything he or she 
desires.  However, this definition of autonomy is dangerous and 
misplaced. 
Id. at 160 (quoting Sean Murphy, Freedom of Conscience and the Needs of the Patient (Banff, 
Alberta, Nov. 2001) (available at http://www.consciencelaws.org/Examining-Conscience-
Ethical/Ethical23.html)) (footnote omitted). 
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something ugly, something that can harm or destroy life, as occurred in 
Nazi Germany; thus, respect for healthcare providers’ consciences and 
encouragement for loud objection to ethical abuses that occur are 
paramount to preserve medical science’s objective of healing.208  Right-
                                                 
208 Preservation of and respect for medical ethics are vital given the potential for medical 
science to harm or destroy life.  Perhaps nothing better illustrates the grotesque abuse of 
medical science and the Hippocratic Oath than the integral role of healthcare providers in 
the experiments, sterilizations, euthanasia, and genocide of Nazi Germany.  Robert Jay 
Lifton has researched what he describes as the “Nazification of the medical profession” and 
the development of “medicalized killing.”  ROBERT JAY LIFTON, THE NAZI DOCTORS:  
MEDICAL KILLING AND THE PSYCHOLOGY OF GENOCIDE 30, 15 (Basic Books 1986).  Through a 
combination of “ideological enthusiasm and systematic terror,” many physicians and 
nurses transformed from healers into killers; some of these practitioners thoroughly agreed 
with and endorsed Nazi racial philosophy while others took employment from the Nazis 
for financial gain.  Id. at 30. 
 The Nazis pursued transformation of the medical field as a policy goal.  Id. at 33.  As 
Rudolf Ramm of the medical faculty of the University of Berlin explained, Nazi medical 
policy aimed at achieving “‘a change in the attitude of each and every doctor, and a 
spiritual and mental regeneration of the entire medical profession.’”  Id.  Lifton relates that 
Gerhard Wagner, “then the leading Nazi medical authority and a zealous advocate of 
sterilization,” denied that any doctors objected to sterilization; at the same time, a Nazi 
newspaper printed a column entitled “Life or Death,” which explained that “the life of the 
nation took precedence over ‘dogma and conflicts of conscience,’ and . . . that opposition to 
the government’s program would be met with strong retaliation.”  Id. at 29.  Dr. Arthur 
Guett suggested that “[t]he doctor, like everyone in Nazi Germany, was expected to 
become ‘hardened,’ to adopt what [Adolf] Hitler himself called the ‘ice-cold logic’ of the 
necessary.”  Id. at 33. 
 Lifton also takes note of Karl Saller, an anthropologist at the University of Munich, 
who criticized certain of the Nazis’ racial ideas and was consequently forced out of the 
university.  Id. at 39.  Lifton suggests that “[w]hile many anthropologists, as well as 
biologists and physicians, must have agreed with his views, they tended to remain silent, 
and [Saller] found himself generally rejected and avoided by former colleagues and 
friends.”  Id.  Thus, fear of government reprisal chilled both support for Karl Saller and 
vocal criticism of Nazi ideas among the academia of the University of Munich.  Id.  
 Against this backdrop of generally coercive conformity, surprisingly the Nazis did 
accommodate personal decisions not to participate in certain medical or killing operations, 
although such choices may not have stemmed from moral objections.  HENRY 
FRIEDLANDER, THE ORIGINS OF NAZI GENOCIDE:  FROM EUTHANASIA TO THE FINAL SOLUTION 
217, 225, 231, 237, 244 (1995).  Nazi killing centers “required voluntary participation, and no 
one was forced to join the killing operations.”  Id. at 232.  Furthermore, “after almost fifty 
years of postwar proceedings, proof has not been provided in a single case that someone 
who refused to participate in killing operations was shot, incarcerated, or penalized in any 
way, except perhaps through transfer to the front,” although “putative duress” was 
certainly prevalent.  Id. at 235–36.  See also CLAUDIA KOONZ, THE NAZI CONSCIENCE 264 
(2003) (“The existence of a doubter here or a rescuer there did not retard the inexorable 
process of expulsion and extermination.  By treating individual objections as private 
matters and not as moral protests, Nazi administrators minimized their political fallout.”). 
 This brief appraisal of Nazi medical abuses and Nazi accommodation of certain 
unwilling officials is not intended to equate proponents of must-fill laws with Nazis or to 
suggest that Nazis were keen proponents of conscience rights.  Quite simply, should 
government prohibit or squelch moral dissent or objection by medical providers, the effects 
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minded societies that respect the individuality and diversity of their 
citizens and afford them the freedom of religious exercise should not 
engage in squelching moral objection by healthcare providers and 
pressuring them to “go along with” the medical establishment and “be 
team players”—the potential for ethical abuse is considerable.209  If 
government action stymies conscientious objection within the medical 
field, nothing will prevent the medical profession from silencing dissent 
when it plunges into ethical turpitude. 
                                                                                                             
would be alarming; just as fear of reprisal chilled both support for Karl Saller and vocal 
criticism of Nazi ideas among the academia of the University of Munich, one can imagine 
that healthcare providers fearful of job loss or civil penalties might become reluctant to 
expose what they view as moral or ethical wrongs. 
 Christian Pross asserts that: 
[T]he search for truth, for new ideas, has motivated scientists and 
doctors for centuries.  Without it there would be no progress, no 
modern diagnostic and therapeutic knowledge or techniques.  In the 
nineteenth century, however, this search became, for science, more and 
more a search for objective truths.  The search for truth in medicine 
turned into destruction when medicine abandoned both the 
Hippocratic nil nocere and its true purpose of healing the sick 
individual, of alleviating suffering—and when this was done for 
science’s own “superior” aims. 
GOTZ ALY, PETER CHROUST & CHRISTIAN PROSS, CLEANSING THE FATHERLAND:  NAZI 
MEDICINE AND RACIAL HYGIENE 2 (Belinda Cooper, trans. 1994). 
 The original Hippocratic Oath reads, in part, as follows: 
I will apply dietetic measures for the benefit of the sick according to 
my ability and judgment; I will keep them from harm and injustice.  I 
will neither give a deadly drug to anybody who asked for it, nor will I 
make a suggestion to this effect.  Similarly I will not give to a woman an 
abortive remedy.  In purity and holiness I will guard my life and my art. 
NOVA Online, Hippocratic Oath—Classical Version, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/ 
doctors/oath_classical.html (last visited Feb. 4, 2010) (emphasis added). 
209 Marcus argues that “[s]tates have responsibilities to the individuals they govern not 
only as subjects, but also as human beings[,]” and that “all individuals are guaranteed the 
rights recognized and enforced by the international community as human rights.”  Marcus, 
supra note 123, at 511.  Consequently, “[r]ecognizing conscientious objection as a human 
right would embody the philosophy, increasingly embraced in international law, that 
certain human rights are so fundamental” that they outweigh “deference to the domestic 
practices” of individual states.  Id.  Thus, the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights states that: 
[e]veryone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and 
religion.  This right shall include freedom to have or to adopt a religion 
or belief of his choice, and freedom, either individually or in 
community with others and in public or private, to manifest his 
religion or belief in worship, observance, practice and teaching. 
Id. at 514–15 (alterations in original). 
 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights does not address a right to conscientious 
objection by name, but it does recognize certain “human rights principles” that form “a 
foundation for identifying the right of conscientious objection as a human right under 
international law.”  Id. at 513. 
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The hypothetical situation described in Part III involving women 
with allegedly limited access to pharmacies underscores the importance 
of giving customers advance notice of their pharmacist’s ethical beliefs, 
avoiding conflict through better planning by the pharmacy and the 
patient.210  Ultimately, though, in a conflict between a patient who has 
the right to make personal healthcare decisions and a pharmacist who 
has a right of free exercise of religion, the pharmacist should prevail:  
while the patient may incur hardship or inconvenience occasioned by a 
delay in obtaining her prescription, a delay would not deny the ultimate 
right to use contraceptives.  If the patient were to prevail, the 
pharmacist’s compelled act would constitute violation of his or her right 
of free exercise.  In other words, the patient’s hardship would not result 
in the suspension of her (or his) rights, but the pharmacist’s hardship 
would itself be a violation of his or her rights.211 
While some areas of the United States have a dearth of pharmacies, 
the hypothetical above fails to grasp the deeper ethical considerations at 
stake.  Ultimately, a deficiency in the marketplace should not translate 
into compelling a pharmacist to violate his or her conscience.  Just 
because there may be few pharmacies from which to choose in a given 
                                                 
210 This is a measure intended merely to accommodate hostile laws or court decisions, not 
an endorsement of obligatory disclosure. 
211 While some have argued that a pharmacist’s refusal to fill a prescription or refer a 
patient to someone who will harms the patient contrary to the pharmacist’s duty of care, 
the pharmacist could argue that his or her refusal stems from a belief that the drug in 
question would itself be a harm to the patient.  If the pharmacist believes that a 
contraceptive could cause an abortion, this is a harm—both to the woman and her unborn 
child—the pharmacist may want to prevent.  In addition, the pharmacist may believe that 
use of the pill creates too great a risk for the development of blood clots or cardiovascular 
problems (particularly among women over 30 who smoke) or that the use of estrogens 
during pregnancy can put a female child at greater risk of developing vaginal or cervical 
cancer after puberty.  RYBACKI, supra note 20, at 781–82.  Some pharmacists may believe 
that contraceptives “promote promiscuity, divorce, the spread of sexually transmitted 
diseases and other societal woes.”  Stein, supra note 21, at A1.  There are many other 
potential side effects harmful to women that pharmacists may want them to avoid by not 
using contraceptives.  See supra note 21 (citing a number of reports of harmful and even 
deadly side effects from the use of certain contraceptives). 
 Again, while respect for the “autonomy and dignity of each patient” is a part of the 
Code of Ethics for Pharmacists, it is listed third after the required promotion of “the good 
of every patient in a caring, compassionate, and confidential manner.”  American 
Pharmacists Association, supra note 125.  Thus, a pharmacist may very well be acting 
consistently with his or her commitment to “promote the good of every patient” when 
refusing to dispense or refer for potentially abortive contraceptives. 
 If a woman is seeking a refill of her prescription for contraceptives and encounters an 
objecting pharmacist, one might wonder how she managed to have the first prescription 
filled.  If her prescription is new and she is delayed for a short time until she can find a 
pharmacist who will fill it, she is in no worse a position than before she obtained the 
prescription. 
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area should not mean that the pharmacists located there should be 
“punished” by this twist of fate. 
B. Recommendations for Objecting Pharmacists 
While objecting pharmacists may believe that they are helpless in the 
face of hostile government action, a somewhat unsympathetic 
professional association, and a general public uninformed about moral 
dilemmas at pharmacies, there may be things a pharmacist can do to 
avoid litigation and accommodate must-fill laws or hostile court 
decisions.212  Because right-of-conscience laws for pharmacists are a 
largely uncharted area of law, there is no guarantee an objecting 
pharmacist can always escape a lawsuit by taking preventive measures.  
However, a few simple actions can work to the pharmacist’s advantage. 
First, immediately upon accepting employment or as soon as 
possible after having begun employment, a conscientious pharmacist 
should notify the employer about his or her moral beliefs; the employer 
should then, consistent with Title VII, take steps to develop a protocol 
for servicing patients that accommodates the pharmacist’s rights.  This 
protocol should provide for an appropriate response by the objecting 
pharmacist:  either the pharmacist will refuse to accept, fill, transfer, or 
refer a prescription for an objectionable drug or the pharmacist will refer 
the patient to another pharmacist on duty or to another pharmacy.  Of 
course, referring or transferring a prescription may be a problem for 
some pharmacists, and some pharmacies may not have another 
pharmacist on duty to fill the prescription. 
                                                 
212 The arguments and recommendations that follow implicate those things a pharmacist 
could do to accommodate must-fill laws or unfriendly court decisions.  In the absence of such 
legal barriers, if a pharmacist believes the contraceptive is a harm to the patient or her 
unborn child, he or she should not be required to publicize personal views to put patients 
on notice because there is technically no duty to dispense anyway, and thus there should 
be no reason to justify or apologize for a refusal to dispense.  However, the 
recommendations that follow could be helpful in avoiding potential Title VII problems. 
 A notice to be distributed and posted could include the following rudimentary 
elements: 
Attention Customers:  Effective May 1, 2010, a pharmacist on staff at 
this facility will not dispense medicines or devices X, Y, or Z.  This 
pharmacist is on staff Monday through Friday from 9am to 5pm.  If 
you need a prescription or refill for medicines or devices X, Y, or Z, 
please be aware that this pharmacist will not handle requests for these 
medicines or devices.  Another pharmacist will be on duty during 
those times, but there may occasions when this pharmacy will not be 
able to provide medicines or devices X, Y, or Z.  Please be aware of this 
and plan accordingly.  The McGillicutty Pharmacy on Route 6 can also 
provide these medicines or devices.  If you have questions, contact Joe 
Smith at 555-5555. 
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An objecting pharmacist needs to know from his or her employer 
what expectations the employer has and what accommodations the 
employer will provide in light of the fact that Title VII only requires an 
accommodation of minimal burden.  The employer who can successfully 
claim that hiring another pharmacist or transferring a workload to 
another pharmacist or technician imposes too large a burden on itself is, 
therefore, not required by Title VII to hire or retain the objecting 
pharmacist.213 
Nevertheless, an objecting pharmacist, in order to accommodate 
potentially hostile laws or courts and possibly to reduce the risk of 
complaints or lawsuits, should post at the pharmacy and on the entrance 
doors of the store signs that provide unambiguous notice that a 
pharmacist with conscientious objections is on staff and that he or she 
will not dispense, transfer, or refer any prescription for the objectionable 
medications in question.  Including notices with every new and old 
prescription that potentially could be filled would also be helpful.  Once 
patients are notified of the pharmacist’s beliefs, they cannot claim that 
they came to rely on him or her to dispense all possible prescriptions.  
Some jurisdictions already require notice that “provides established 
customers, who are otherwise most likely to have a claim against the 
pharmacist’s assistance, with the proper expectations.”214 
It would also be to the pharmacist’s benefit not even to physically 
accept a patient’s prescription for an objectionable drug.  Once the 
pharmacist physically accepts the prescription, one could argue that he 
or she has assumed a duty at least to transfer the prescription or refer the 
patient elsewhere.  If, on the other hand, the pharmacist refuses even to 
accept the prescription when it is tendered, he or she might be able to 
avoid assuming any duty.  Of course, a patient could claim that as a 
pharmacist, he or she still has a professional obligation to see that the 
patient’s needs are satisfied by someone.  If the pharmacist’s policy has 
also been posted on signs at the pharmacy and on the building’s entrance 
doors by the time a patient tenders a prescription for an objectionable 
                                                 
213 Again, HHS expressly exempted the conscience regulation from Title VII’s provision 
that an employer must accommodate an employee only to the extent that doing so would 
not be an undue burden.  Worobec & Gray, supra note 116, at 36. 
214 Spreng, supra note 42, at 353.  Including with every new prescription or every refill a 
flyer explaining that an objecting pharmacist is on staff at the pharmacy may be impractical 
because of costs or because of the volume of prescriptions dispensed.  Granted, once a 
patient has received a notice either because he or she has obtained a new prescription or a 
refill, he or she need not continue to receive notices subsequently.  In the least, posting a 
flyer at the pharmacy and on the doors of the building in which the pharmacy is located is 
not impractical or costly and may very well be adequate to alert customers. 
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drug, it becomes harder to argue that the pharmacist arbitrarily or 
prejudicially refused to fill the patient’s prescription. 
In the end, putting patients on notice is absolutely vital; the impression 
that a pharmacist “sprang” his or her objections on a patient does not 
make the pharmacist more sympathetic in the eyes of the patient—or a 
court.215  Also crucial is that a pharmacist not obstruct a patient’s access to 
medication.  Passive refusal to interface with a medication is one thing, 
but destroying or refusing to return a prescription, harassing patients, or 
engaging in civil disobedience deeply hurts a pharmacist’s case.216  
Ultimately, though, not even stocking the medications in question may 
be the best thing a pharmacist can do if he or she has control over the 
pharmacy’s inventory.217 
                                                 
215 In spite of Neil Noesen’s writing to his employer about his objections and total refusal 
to interface with contraceptives, he and his employer lacked a formal and fail-safe protocol 
for handling requests for contraceptives.  Noesen v. Medical Staffing Network, Inc., 232 
Fed. Appx. 581, 583 (2007).  The patient who requested from him a refill of her oral 
contraceptives was not on notice that he would refuse to refill the prescription so that 
Noesen’s refusal came as a surprise to her.  Harrington, supra note 104, at 807.  Had better 
precautions been taken, perhaps Noesen and this patient could have avoided conflict 
altogether.  Then again, his desired accommodations may simply have been too 
burdensome for any employer to provide in light of Title VII’s acknowledgement that 
accommodations need not impose more than a de minimis burden on the employer. 
 The Supreme Court’s holding in the Smith decision is a reasonable recognition that 
there have to be some limits on the extent to which the government must accommodate 
religious believers, but it should have articulated a distinction between denying a believer 
an exemption from a neutral and generally applicable law and coercing him to act contrary 
to his conscience.  While the former may be inevitable in a pluralistic society, the latter is 
much harder, if not impossible, to justify.  See Stone, supra note 52.  Stone notes that  
there may be and probably is a very radical distinction between 
compelling a citizen to refrain from acts which he regards as moral but 
which the majority of his fellow citizens and the law regard as immoral 
or unwholesome to the life of the state on the one hand, and 
compelling him on the other to do affirmative acts which he regards as 
unconscientious and immoral. 
Id. 
216 Cf. Spreng, supra note 29, at 241–43. 
217 Cf. Yoder, supra note 74, at 1014–15.  A growing number of pharmacies have made the 
choice not to stock products they find objectionable, including DMC Pharmacy in 
Chantilly.  The pharmacy is part of Divine Mercy Care, a Catholic-affiliated nonprofit 
organization, whose chairman stated that “‘[w]e’re trying not to leave our faith at the 
door . . . ’”, and “‘[w]e’re trying to create an environment where belief and professionalism 
come together.’”  Stein, supra note 21, at A1. 
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C. A Proposed Conscience Law for Pharmacists 
South Dakota’s conscience law, while not perfect, should serve as the 
base for a model pharmacist conscience law for all states.218  The law 
provides a pharmacist an unfettered exemption from dispensing any 
medication that could be abortifacient in nature or be used in a 
euthanasia, assisted-suicide, or mercy-killing context.219  The law also 
provides the pharmacist with civil immunity and protection from 
discrimination.220 
However, the law does not provide any explicit exemption for 
pharmacists who object to transferring prescriptions or referring patients 
to other pharmacies.221  This omission could be used by courts to 
conclude that, particularly in light of the expectations of APhA, 
pharmacists should at least refer patients or transfer their prescriptions, 
and a refusal to do so is an abdication of their duties.  In addition, South 
Dakota exempts a pharmacist if he or she has reason to believe a 
medication would be used as an abortifacient, but the means to make this 
determination would almost require clairvoyance on the part of the 
pharmacist.222  Furthermore, “the statutory language almost invites a 
battle of experts on whether an emergency contraceptive interferes with 
the implantation of a fertilized egg.”223  Thus, a model law should 
include an explicit provision exempting pharmacists from having to 
interface with contraceptives so as to avoid creating both ambiguity and 
room for a hostile court or jury to find liability on the part of the 
pharmacist; the Arkansas Family Planning Act features such a provision 
and the model law proposed below incorporates this provision, with 
modification.224 
                                                 
218 S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 36-11-70 (2008).  See Nelson, supra note 32, at 163 (discussing 
South Dakota statute). 
219 S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 36-11-70 (2008). 
220 Id. 
221 The law also does not include drugs used in capital punishment among those that 
pharmacists are exempt from dispensing, but a model law should provide such an 
exemption. 
222 Spreng, supra note 42, at 379. 
223 Id. at 378. 
224 The pertinent part of the Arkansas Family Planning Act provides that: 
(4) Nothing in this subchapter shall prohibit a physician, pharmacist, 
or any other authorized paramedical personnel from refusing to 
furnish any contraceptive procedures, supplies, or information; and 
(5) No private institution or physician, nor any agent or employee of 
the institution or physician, nor any employee of a public institution 
acting under directions of a physician, shall be prohibited from 
refusing to provide contraceptive procedures, supplies, and 
information when the refusal is based upon religious or conscientious 
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As Jessica J. Nelson suggests, a conscience law should be expressly 
limited to specific drugs that create conscience problems for pharmacists, 
namely those that can act as abortifacients or that are used in life-ending 
contexts.225  Indeed, South Dakota’s law appears to be limited to just 
these types of medications.  Additionally, a model conscience law should 
make it clear that the pharmacist is not permitted to harass or slander a 
patient or sabotage the patient’s access to the medication he or she 
seeks;226 such a standard should discourage arbitrary objections and 
ensure that an objection is rooted in deeply-held moral or religious 
beliefs.  Yoder rightly includes in her own model law a provision 
permitting a pharmacy not to stock medications to which its 
management objects or for which there would be little demand; such a 
provision should be in every pharmacist conscience law.227  Finally, a 
model law should require that a pharmacist discuss any reservations 
with his or her employer and develop a protocol for dealing with 
requests for objectionable drugs and this policy should be posted at the 
pharmacy and at the entrance of the building in which the pharmacy is 
located.228  By taking these last steps, patients can be placed on notice, 
and pharmacists and their employers will have an easier time denying 
any duty to dispense the medication in question. 
Here this Note uses South Dakota’s law as a basis and adds the 
above-mentioned recommendations.  The Author’s additions are 
italicized.229 
Model Right-of-Conscience Protection for Pharmacists Statute 
 
A. No pharmacist or pharmacy may be required to stock or dispense 
medication if, in the professional judgment of the pharmacist or pharmacy, the 
medication could be used to: 
(1) Cause an abortion anytime after the union of a sperm and egg; or 
                                                                                                             
objection.  No such institution, employee, agent, or physician shall be 
held liable for the refusal. 
ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-16-304(4)–(5) (2008). 
225 Nelson, supra note 32, at 163. 
226 Id.  Again, passive refusal to interface with a certain drug should be protected by law, 
but destroying or refusing to return a doctor’s prescription, lying to a patient, or slandering 
her character are all inappropriate acts and are probably already illegal throughout the 
United States.  See Spreng, supra note 42, at 351–52 (distinguishing passive refusal from civil 
disobedience). 
227 Yoder, supra note 74, at 1021. 
228 Again, this is a measure intended merely to accommodate hostile laws or court 
decisions, not an endorsement of obligatory disclosure. 
229 The provision in part B of the proposed statute is taken from the Arkansas Family 
Planning Act.  See ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-16-304(4)–(5) (2008). 
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(2) Destroy an unborn child; or 
(3) Cause the death of any human being, regardless of age, health, or 
condition of dependency, by means of an assisted suicide, 
euthanasia, mercy killing, execution, or any other means. 
B. A pharmacist shall not be prohibited from refusing to furnish any 
contraceptive procedures, supplies, or information and no private institution or 
pharmacist, nor any agent or employee of the institution or pharmacist, nor any 
employee of a public institution acting under directions of a pharmacist, shall be 
prohibited from refusing to provide contraceptive procedures, supplies, and 
information when the refusal is based upon religious or conscientious objection. 
No such institution, employee, agent, or pharmacist shall be held liable for the 
refusal. 
C. No such refusal to dispense medication pursuant to this section or to 
refer a patient or transfer a prescription to an entity that will provide the 
medication may be the basis for any claim for damages against the 
pharmacist or the pharmacy of the pharmacist or the basis for any 
disciplinary, recriminatory, or discriminatory action against the 
pharmacist. 
D. No pharmacist may be permitted to harass or slander a patient who requests 
a medication to which the pharmacist objects.  A pharmacist may not be 
permitted to obstruct a patient’s access to medication but may passively refuse 
to facilitate access to it. 
E. Every pharmacist who objects to interfacing with medications he or she 
believes will be used consistent with A or B above must discuss such objections 
with his or her employer and the employer shall take steps, consistent with Title 
VII, to develop a protocol to accommodate objecting pharmacists. 
F. A notice indicating that an objecting pharmacist is on staff at a pharmacy 
and a copy of the pharmacy’s protocol explaining in understandable terms that 
the pharmacist or pharmacy does not stock or will not dispense, refer patients, or 
transfer prescriptions when certain drugs are involved shall be posted clearly on 
the entrance doors of the building in which the pharmacy is located and at the 
pharmacy counter. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
In closing, both history and common sense point to the 
appropriateness and logic of affording pharmacists a right of conscience.  
This issue will no doubt become more publicized and debated in the 
years to come as legislatures, courts, pharmacists, and the public they 
serve further develop and chart pertinent laws and rights.  Out of respect 
for the dignity, heartfelt moral beliefs, and First Amendment rights of 
pharmacists, and in order to preserve the ethics of the medical profession 
at large, right-of-conscience laws are absolutely fundamental for 
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pharmacists (and healthcare workers in general).  It is the Author’s hope 
that both the law and public sentiment will more fully reflect these 
considerations in the immediate future. 
Michael E. Duffy* 
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spite of the cultural unpopularity of doing so. 
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